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1 Introduction
The term ”alternative energy” was born in 70’s as a consequence of the political sit-
uation in the Middle East (in the year 1973) when the oil supplies (specially from
Saudi-Arabia and Iran) to the west was stopped or redirected to Egypt on the back-
ground of the war situation. And since then, the security of the supply and searching
for alternative energy resources is on the top of the agenda of the industrialized coun-
tries. The term was then changed to the most widely used one ”renewable energy” ,
and renewable energy sources now are a fundamental element in the energy mix in the
future scenarios of many countries whether developing or industrialized.
Figure 1.1: Structure of RES-E supply in Germany 2012
Source: [BMU14]
In Germany Renewable Energy Sources for Electricity (RES-E) are transforming
from a supportive to a main source of Electricity. In the year 2000 the Energy Source
Act (EEG) was implemented with a fixed feed-in-tariff (FIT) to build a foundation
for the RES market , and boost the RES-E share in the electricity profile of Germany
[DBMF12]. The current RES-E share of the total electricity consumption has risen
above expectations with a share of 23.5 % in the year 2012 [BMU14]. This share which
includes a high portion of fluctuating and inflexible RES such as wind and solar as
presented in figure 1.1 on one hand, and the need of generation and demand balanc-
ing on the electricity grid on the other hand, requires reconsideration of the incentive
schemes oriented to shifting the operation behaviour from the current ”produce and
Forget” strategy into a more demand oriented one. Some politicians and scientists
are arguing that this RES increase is too fast and can have a negative effect on the
1
electricity market. They also refer to the Fixed Feed In Tariff (FIT) scheme as the
reason of such an effect and that it is outdated[BPAZB12]. Consequently it has to be
reviewed or replaced with other schemes supporting RES direct marketing to create
a supply and demand coordination in order to avoid any consequences on the energy
security in the presence of high shares of highly fluctuating RES.
The new proposed supporting mechanisms for the German energy policy, aim to
integrate the RES-E into the market. Introducing mechanisms as Market Premium to
link the remuneration with energy market prices, doesn’t target a fundamental change
in the supporting mechanisms structure, but it gives an incentive for the RES-E market
actors (like investors and power plant operators) to gain the initial market experience
that can help in the future steps of RES-E wide market integration [GP13a]. The
existence of the sliding market premium on monthly bases in parallel with the fixed feed-
in tariff, gives the investor the choice to take his investment decision based on the lower
risk coupled with the adapted scheme on one hand, and the possibility of achieving
higher revenues on the other hand. In addition to helping the market actors to gain
enough market experience, the German RES-E supporting schemes and mechanisms
have a positive influence on the deployment of the RES-E helping to reach the future
RES-E scenario targets [BMU12a]. On the long term when today’s technologies become
more mature, the market actors can take advantage of the early gaining of market
experience and participating in a ”Competitive Auction” RES-E market, which appears
to be the unavoidable heirs to successful Feed-In Tariff programs[BPAZB12].
1.1 Background
Why RES-E needs support mechanisms? The high costs of RES-E, in addition to the
dispatchability and high fluctuation of resources have made it impossible for the RES-
E to grow without regulatory intervention. The design of mechanisms varies in order
to create incentives that can lead to the fulfilment of certain objectives. Mechanisms
design criteria differ according to digression rules, caps, eligibility periods and the
degree of differentiation between RES-E technologies[LEG12]. Different mechanisms
are currently implemented in the EU like the feedin-tariffs, feedin-premiums, quota
obligations and other instruments as shown in figure 1.2 , even parallel existing RES-E
schemes are adapted like the current case in Germany with the feedin-tariff and the
market premium.
Germany had successfully boosted the deployment of diverse RES-E technologies
helping in taking them along the learning curves and support the immature technologies
to move beyond the R&D phase to participate in the RES-E market. This diversity is
extremely important as we do not know which of these technological mixes can create
the optimum solution for a 100% RES future. In comparison with other European
members like UK, the German support mechanisms have been more successful as shown
in figure 1.3. The installed capacity of wind energy in Germany has risen from 48 MW
in 1990 to 4500 MW in 2000 (when the EEG replaced the StrEG), reaching 20,622
MW in 2006 [BME06].UK remained with low increase from 10 MW in 1990 to 1960
MW by the end of 2006 [IEA04].
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Figure 1.2: Renewable Energy support mechanisms in EU Member states
Source: [Bey12]
The market premium schemes have three main objectives in general; First is the
market integration of RES-E in a narrow sense, second is the RES-E system integration
by providing the RES-E plant operators with incentives to supply balancing power and
ancillary services and encourage demand oriented production. Finally, to create an
incentive for the change of distribution channels through direct marketing [GP13a].
These objectives can be effective to engage the RES-E plant operators to the mar-
ket prices in terms of gaining enough experience about the market. However, it is
questionable whether it is confirmed that the current mechanism design is sufficient to
integrate all kinds or RES-E specially the non-dispatchable intermittent RES like wind
and solar into electricity market in the future, beside the encouragement of investments
in flexible plant designs on the longer run or not.
1.2 Objectives and Questions
New policies have to be proposed and adapted to structure an economical sustainable
and environmental friendly RES market under the scenario targets of the “energy con-
3
Figure 1.3: Installed capacity in Germany and the UK (1990-2004).
Source:[BN08]
cept” of the year 2011 (35% share of RES in electricity production by 2020, 50% by
2030, 65% by 2040 and up to 80% by 2050), and even more ambitious scenarios like
the (BMU) “lead Study”[DLR12] (86%— of RES share in 2050). The other scenarios
target is 100% renewable by 2050 . These new policies will lead to a new market struc-
ture which will have an impact on all actors of Energy market.
Most of the regulatory design of RES-E support mechanisms focus on discussing
the effectiveness and efficiency of the different mechanisms. While there are some few
studies take into consideration the analysis of impact on market actors and market
structure, in addition to the advantages and disadvantages of the support mechanism
components[BPAZB12]. An empirical market related research or practical modelling
efforts have to be carried out to avoid these impacts being overlooked, while the im-
portance of RES-E is raising in Germany.
”On the one hand, VRE1 generators need to be exposed to price signals that reflect
the different value of electricity (depending on the time and location of generation), so
as to facilitate system integration. On the other hand, VRE requires capital-intensive
technology and as such, is highly sensitive to investment risk, a risk that is increased by
short-term price exposure. An appropriate market design will need to strike a delicate
balance between these two objectives.” [IEA14].
This is the main challenge this study is trying to come up with a solution for ;
through focusing on the analysis of the implications of RES-E support mechanisms on
two key actors, RES-E Investors and Power Plant Operators , trying to answer
the following questions:
1. How different support mechanism scenarios can affect the RES-E investment ?
2. How new support mechanisms can create an incentive for plant operation, in
1 Variable Renewable Energy (e.g. Wind and PV)
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order to achieve a coordination in electricity market between the demand and
supply in the existence of high shares of fluctuating RES ?
1.3 Thesis Structure
This study contains seven chapters, starting with the introduction which gives an
overview on the the study scope, the motivation behind selecting this point of research
and the main research questions needed to be answered within the scope of the study.
The second chapter gives a basic knowledge regarding the electricity markets, through
discussing briefly the different market types and contracts. It also discusses the his-
tory of electricity market liberalization, and the changes of the electricity market after
liberalization. In addition, the impact of high share of RES-E on the electricity market.
The third chapter is focusing on the RES-E investment and operation related as-
pects. It give a fundamental knowledge regarding the economic assessment of RES-E
generation investment, and the different risks faced by investors and operators in a
liberalized electricity market. Moreover, an important section of this chapter is the
sensitivity analysis for the impacts of the risk factors on the project financial indica-
tors. An introduction for the RES-E policy is given in this chapter as well. Moreover,
a description for the currently used support mechanisms in Germany.
Chapter four is the core part of the study. It gives a description for the RESMIP
(RES-E Support Mechanisms implications on Investment and Plant Operation) Model,
which is a developed model to analyze the implications of different RES-E support
mechanisms on investment and plant operation. This chapter also includes a de-
tailed description regarding the different scenarios investigated in the study using the
RESMIP model, and the assumptions related to each stage of the investigation. The
outcome and results of each investigation stage in the model presented in the second
section of this chapter, are essential for understanding the results, as they already
represent a part of the final results.
In chapter five the different scenarios analysis final results are presented for Wind
Onshore and PV, using various support mechanism scenarios.
The conclusion and recommendations chapter highlight the important findings of
the study. In addition, this chapter discuss the RESMIP model capabilities, strengths,
factors of uncertainty and how these uncertainties can be improved. Furthermore,
it includes one of the most important parts of the study, which is what the study
recommends for policy makers to take into consideration while structuring a RES-E
support mechanism or policy.
The outlook gives a wide overview on the study, and the points of future enhancement
and development for the RESMIP model.
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2 Electricity Markets Fundamentals
What is the difference between electricity and any other commodity?
Electric energy is treated as a commodity in the electricity market. However, there
are major differences between it and other commodities, this have an effect on the
organization and the rules of electricity markets.
The fundamental difference is that the electrical energy is linked with and the phys-
ical system that function much faster than any market. This physical power system
need to have a second by second balance between supply and demand. Otherwise,the
system will collapse and the consequences can be catastrophic on the technical, social
and economical scales. An imbalance in a gas pipeline between production and con-
sumption will last much longer before it cause a collapse of the pipeline network. But
for electricity it is totally different, and the consequences of slight changes in electric
power criteria (e.g voltage or frequency) for a very short period of time can be undesir-
able. That is why balancing the supply and demand on the short run is a process which
can not be left to the relatively slower and unaccountable entity such as a market.
Another significant difference is that in the electric power system, the energy pro-
duced by a specific generator can not be directed to a specific consumer (unless they
are not isolated from the system). This require all the connected generators to be
synchronized to be able to feed the loads, not to be a burden on the network. This
system can have an advantage on the economic scale as the maximum generation ca-
pacity has to be comparable with the maximum needed demand, not with the sum of
all the maximum individual demands connected to the system. However, it also has a
disadvantage due to the dependency in the system, in case a breakdown takes place,
everybody will be affected.
Comparing economical storage of electricity to other commodities can surely give
an indication for another difference. Electric energy must be produced at the time it
is consumed, as storing big quantities of electric energy is not an economic feasible
solution as in other commodities.
Finally, the variations of the cost and price of electricity over the course of the day
are very unusual compared to other commodities.[Kir04]
All these differences make the electric energy a different and dynamic commodity,
which needs a special market design that can guarantee the security of supply and the
reliability of the system on second bases.
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2.1 Overview of the types of Electricity Markets and
Contracts
The following section will give a brief overview of some selected (not all) electricity
markets and contracts.
Spot market
In the spot market, the seller delivers a commodity and the buyer pays for it ”on the
spot”, which means that neither party can back out of the deal. A spot market has
the advantage of immediacy. But on the other hand a sudden increase in the demand
(or drop in production) affects the prices dramatically, which makes the prices in the
spot market tends to change quickly.[Kir04]
Electricity day-ahead market is an electric energy spot market example. It is a
market that is held a day before the actual operation take place in the physical system.
Electricity is negotiated for a provision of 24 hours ahead. Participants involved in this
market are committed to supply or consume the electrical energy quantities agreed on
the time adapted by the contract at defined market prices. This market set a spot
price which reflect the supply and demand balance on the short term. However, these
short term prices are subjected to volatilities, which is primarily due to the non-storable
nature of electric energy, and the potential of change in the supply or demand because of
the resource availability needs or demand behavior sudden changes. A complimentary
market to the day-ahead market is the hour-ahead market which takes place at the
same day of operation.[HS13b]
Forward contracts
Forward contract is a non-standardized contract for delivering a defined fixed quantity
of product at a fixed price at a specific date between two market participants (a seller
and a buyer). These contracts are almost exclusively negotiated or traded in the
over the counter market1, and they are difficult to resell the no longer needed traded
quantity.[HS13b].
Future contracts
The contracts in this market are not backed by physical delivery, this is why they are
called future contracts [Kir04]. It is like a forward contract but standardized and easier
to trade. Quantity of electricity, price, delivery period and delivery profile (during peak
or base load period) are defined in advance, and the parties involved are obligated to
fulfill their contracts at the adapted time in the contract. They are also eligible to
close their position before the time of selling there contracts[HS13b].
Options
An option is a contract that can be exercised only if the holder of the contract decides
that it is in his interest to do so[Kir04]. It is not obligatory for options to be exercised
1 In a direct way between the two market participants
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from a buyer or a seller. There are two types of options: (call options) which is
an option to buy, and (put options) which is an option to sell[HS13b]. Options are
exercised differently in different markets. A European option can be exercised only on
it’s expiry date, on the other hand an option can be exercised at any time before the
expiry date in the US.
Contracts for difference
In the contract for differences, the parties agree on a quantity and a ”strike price”.
Then they take a part of the market and once the trading is completed the contract
for difference has two settlement options. If the strike price is higher than the market
price, the buyer pays the seller the difference between these two prices multiplied by
the amount agreed in the contract, on the other hand if the stick price is lower the
seller pays the buyer the difference. It insulates the parties from the market prices,
while allowing them to take part in this market.[Kir04]
2.2 Electricity Markets Liberalization and The Impact
of High Shares of RES-E
2.2.1 Introduction to the Liberalization of Electricity Markets
The trend of energy market liberalization was initiated in Chile at the early 1980s in the
generation sector[HS13a]. Then distributed around Europe starting the late 1980s in
the United Kingdom and gradually migrated to many European countries like France,
Germany and others since 1999[Sio13]. Today many political systems around the world
are adapting this energy market structure. This new market structure made a remark-
able shift on the bases of investment choice. Before liberalization cost minimization was
the base of the investor behavior. However, after liberalization the investment choice
base is shifted to profit maximization in a competitive environment[FBH13]. Introduc-
ing renewable energy sources to the electricity market eventually, create a paradigm
shift on the understanding of the whole electricity system. This shift will include an
effect on both the technical level and the market structure and behavior. The effect on
the technical level is by switching from an inflexible one way grid where changes is load
behavior that can be followed by adjustment on the generation level, and load and gen-
eration matches. To a flexible grid that allows two ways of electricity flow with smarter
system to handle the management of generation and load matching in the existence
of high share of intermittent RES-E. On the other side of the coin, the effect on the
RES-E market can be seen in the prices and market actors (investors and RES-E plant
operators) behavior under new mechanisms and incentives. This section is focusing on
the Impact of high shares of RES-E on the market, which is highly important point in
the existence of rapid growth of RES-E generation in the German electricity market,
in addition to the scenarios of reaching high shares of RES-E in the future.
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2.2.2 Changes of Electricity Markets After Liberalization
When the liberalization of energy markets started in Europe, considerable excess ca-
pacities existed, and the expectations was that the prices will (always) reflect the short
term marginal costs (STMCs)2[Sio13]. Figure 2.1 illustrate how the prices are defined
in the market with conventional capacities of hydro, nuclear and conventional electricity
power plants.
Figure 2.1: Merit order supply curve with conventional capacities.
Source: [Sio13]
As seen in figure 2.1 , the interaction between the demand curve and supply curve
define what is called the market clearing price based on the system marginal costs.
The first demand curve Dt1 represents a low demand period and the second demand
curve Dt2 represents a high demand period. The clearing market price for electricity
for Dt1 is as can be seen Pt1. This price is lower than the clearing price at Dt2 which is
Pt2. The difference between Pt1 and Pt2 is called price spread, which is a high relevant
term to a market with high share of RES-E.
The price patterns in Germany and other European countries3 came with a different
behavior than what it was expected as a consequence of electricity market liberaliza-
tion. The prices experienced considerable differences between various markets. There
2 STMCs is a representation for the variable costs
3 As illustrated in figure 5.12 at [Sio13]
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was high prices in 2008 and then a fall in the prices in Europe. The reason for the high
prices in 2008 is due to low hydro availability, and the falling prices after 2008 were
attributed to the economic crisis.
There was a change in the average costs of production which defines the electricity
prices after liberalization as presented in figure 2.2. However, it can be expected that
there will be a deviation from the concept of the STMC price regime explained before
in figure 2.1 once excess generation capacity is exhausted. As there will be a shift
toward long-term marginal costs (LTMC)4, it can also be expected that generators will
try to influence the prices by acting strategically during the periods of high demand
and limited available generation capacity and the consequence can be higher electricity
prices rather than the prices defined by the STMC. But what the case will be if a
generation with zero marginal costs is introduced with high shares in the market like
RES-E, affecting the principles behind STMC. This question will be further discussed.
Figure 2.2: Changes of pricing electricity before and after liberalization of electricity
markets
Source: [Sio13]
2.2.3 The Impact of High Shares of RES-E in the Electricity
Market
RES-E shares are rapidly growing in the EU, with some backdrops that arises three
key questions in countries like Germany, Denmark, Spain and others [Sio13]:
4LTMC represents variable plus fixed costs
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1. What is the impact of large amounts of RES-E generation feeding in the grid
especially during low demand periods?
2. What is the impact of intermittent RES-E on the costs at which fossil especially
natural gas - capacities are offered?
3. What is the effect of renewables on price spreads overtime?
In the following sections we will discuss only the impact of RES-E on the market
prices and price spreads as they are relevant to the scope of the study. The RES-E
impact on fossil capacities will not be discussed in details, but it can be checked at
[Sio13].
The Impact of RES-E on the Market Price
Renewable resources except few (hydro, geothermal and biomass) are intermittent by
nature, not predictable nor dispatchable. The introduction of large shares of RES-E
takes into consideration the major difference in the marginal costs between the conven-
tional power plants, and some RES-E like Wind and PV with essentially zero marginal
cost, and feeding into grid in the periods of low demand results in lowering the market
clearing price, even leading to negative prices [Sio13][GP13a].
Figure 2.3: Merit order supply curve with and without additional PV capacities at on-
peak time of a bright summer day with STMCs for conventional capacities
Source: [Sio13]
The effect of RES-E on the market prices has been experienced in many countries
like Germany. This effect can be called the merit order effect of RES-E. An example of
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this effect in a sunny day in Germany on the 22 of October 2011 is illustrated in figure
2.3. It can be recognized that the PV generation not only displaced virtually all hydro
generation, but also shifted the supply curve to the right, which essentially pushed
nuclear and fossil-fuelled generation out of the market due to that the marginal costs
of the PV is zero as other RES-E technologies (e.g. Wind energy). There is an effect
as well on the formation of the price, as this shift results in lower spot prices during a
period when they tend to be high. If this effect happened in an off-peak period when
prices are already low, it will cause the prices to be even lower, leading to increase
the volume of intraday trading, as traders will want to take advantage of the price
difference in different market [Sio13].
Figure 2.4: Negative electricity prices on the EPPEX spot market from 01.01.2011 to
31.12.2012.
Source: [GP13a]
Prices can also reach negative values if the demand is very low, and there is excess
of zero marginal cost RES-E supply. Figure 2.4 shows the amount of negative prices
in EPEX spot market in Germany during the years 2011 and 2012, In 2011, negative
prices occurred in 15 hour of the year, affecting a total of 464.2 GWh. In 2012 up to
November prices were negative in 23h, and 33h in December, which makes a total of
56 negative prices hours in 2012 affecting 1811.4 GWh [GP13a]. One can expect more
dramatic impacts on the market prices in the existence of high share of RES-E.
2.2.4 Effect of Renewables on Price Spreads
Figure 2.5 presents a hypothetical scenario with high levels of generation from Wind,
PV and hydro plants over a week in summer using synthetic hourly data for an average
year in Germany done by [Sio13]. The aim of the scenario is to answer the question
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Figure 2.5: Development of intermittent renewables from Wind,PV, and run-of-river
hydro plants over a week in summer on an hourly basis in comparison to
demand and resulting electricity market prices with total costs charged for
conventional capacities in Germany
Source: [Sio13]
how will the price spread in Europe markets evolve in the future as large amounts of
PV, Solar thermal and Wind generation are added to the network?
It can be recognized that the electricity market prices (black solid line) experiences
high volatility5 due to the variation of the demand and RES-E supply. It can be
possible that future high prices will not necessarily appear at peak-demand time but
as times of low availability of RES-E supply. Such a high volatility in the prices is
subjected to an increase as a consequence of the attractiveness to invest in storage
technologies to take advantage of the price difference, and make flexible peaking unites
much more valuable than they currently are. However, currently the business model of
the pumped hydro plants is affected, as the depended before in the differences between
low and high prices ( for example low prices at night due to low demand and high
at noon due to high demand) to make profit from selling electricity at the high price
period. But due to that the PV production lower the prices at noon time, this affects
the price spreads and creates a need for a new business model for the low responding
(in terms of time) storage technologies.
5 As defined before the price spread is the difference between the off-peak and on-peak price of
electricity
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The effects of the development of RES-E on the prices in electricity mar-
kets can be summarized as:
• More price volatility on hourly and daily bases.
• Increasing relevance of intraday markets.
• Higher prices for fossil and flexible capacities and storage for balancing the in-
termittent renewable generation.
• Growth of balancing markets and intensified completion at the level of decentral-
ized balancing organization.[Sio13]
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3 RES-E Generation Capacities
Investment and Operation
This chapter is based on there main sections. In the first section the economic assess-
ment of RES-E generation investment will be discussed. Followed by the different risks
faced in a liberalized electricity market section, which includes a sensitivity analysis
for the different risk factors impacts for Onshore Wind and PV cases. The last section
will focus on the RES-E policy and support mechanisms applied currently in Germany,
and the interaction between the RES-E policy in general with the different risks in the
liberalized electricity market.
Figure 3.1: Conceptual stages of project development
Source:[WP98]
It is important to have an overview on the project development process before dis-
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cussing the related points to investment and operation of RES-E generation capacities,
but we can not specify a certain project development process applicable on all RES-E
technology types and different business segments. An overall process of project devel-
opment is shown in figure 3.1 [WP98].
In general the figure shows that there are nine stages starting from the project fea-
sibility to the decommissioning of the plant. Understanding the details related to each
stage is not necessary, however it is important to keep in mind the different stages as
it will be referred to it in later sections.
3.1 Economic Assessment of RES-E Generation
Investment
3.1.1 Financial evaluation Approaches in General
A financial evaluation over the project lifetime is a logical way to assess the economic
feasibility of a project. Such evaluation have two approaches to be done, a static
approach and a dynamic approach [Fin85].






















Figure 3.2: Financial Evaluation different approaches and methods
Source: Author’s illustration based on information provide by [Fin85]
Figure 3.2 presents the different methods used under each evaluation approach. The
Static evaluation methods are calculated of profitability, static pay-back period, static
annuity costs and cost comparison. The dynamic evaluation methods are the dynamic
pay-back period, calculation of future value, dynamic annuity cost comparison, net
present value(NPV), internal rate of return (IRR) and levelized cost.
The difference between the static and dynamic evaluation is the consideration of the
time component. The dynamic evaluation approach takes into account the different
times at which a transaction takes place. Under this approach all payments are com-
pounded at a reference point in time (e.g. before the plant is commissioned at t=0) in
case they fall due before this time, or discounted if they come after this time. Because
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of this consideration of the time component in investment evaluation, ”the dynamic
procedures undoubtedly produce better results than the static procedures” [Fin85].
But on the other hand, the static evaluation is more simpler, and easier evaluation
approach which can serve as an approximation of the dynamic evaluation. Therefore
only selected dynamic evaluation methods will be further discussed in this section.
3.1.2 Dynamic Financial Evaluation Methods
Advantages and disadvantages of the dynamic evaluation methods are discussed in
table 3.1.
Dynamic method Advantages Disadvantages
NPV - Includes discounting for future
value (inflation rate, opportunity
cost,interest rate, liquidation of
assets).
- Dose not include portfolio effect
analysis.
- Comparison between investment
with similar life times.
IRR - A comparison tool for invest-
ment option with the same risk
level
- Assumption have to be made for
the calculation process
Future Value - Same concept of NPV, however
the calculation are referring to the
end of the project life time.
- Non specialised investors are not
familiar of it’s meaning.
Dynamic payback - Simple calculation method - Cash flow have to be constant
over years of the project.
- Does not look at the rate of re-
turn.
Levelized cost - Used to compare different tech-
nologies costs per unit of produc-
tion.
- Based only on the costs of the
project, not the net cashflow.
Dynamic Annuity - Simple calculation method. - Used if all investment items have
a constant lifetime.
Table 3.1: Dynamic financial evolution methods overview
References: [MR11, Fin85, Fra12, Pfa12a]
The following section will give more details related to the selected evaluation methods
which will be used under the scope of the study, as in the sensitivity analysis in the
following section in the current chapter, and in the modelling in chapter 4 and the
results in chapter 5.
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Net Present Value (NPV)
The Net Present value is the sum of the present values of the revenues and costs (cash
inflows and outflows) linked to investment discounted to a reference point in time (usu-
ally before the project commissioning at t=0), at a given discount rate.[Fin85, MR11,
Hol12].
It is defined as:






References: [Fin85, MR11, RET05, Hol12]
Where:
I0 = initial investment costs at a time period (t=0),
n = number of years (e.g. project lifetime),
NCFt = Net Cash-Flow at time period t,
r = Discount rate,
t = time of payment (e.g. project year).
If the NPV can be calculated in Euro, a NPV ≥ 0 reflects that the sum of the
discounted cash flows is greater than the initial investment. This gives an indication
that there is a possibility of making profits, in order to make the investment fleabites.
NPV is an important financial indicator, it is used as a base to calculate other
financial indicators (e.g. IRR). In addition, it reflects the economic feasibility of a
certain investment including all types of cash flows (e.g. revenues and costs) over the
project lifetime, taking into consideration the time component.
Internal Rate of Return (IRR)
The Internal Rate of Return is the interest rate at which the cumulative NPV of the
project is zero. It can be considered as a special form of the NPV, and it represents
the achievable interest on the capital tied-up in the investment [Fin85].
It is defined as:








I0 = initial investment costs at a time period (t=0),
n = number of years (e.g. project lifetime),
NCFt = Net Cash-Flow at time period t,
IRR = Internal Rate of Return,
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t = time of payment (e.g. project year).
IRR is calculated in %. It is a common used evaluation method, which can be
understandable by investors to be used as a compared value to a minimum defined
interest rate (e.g. cut-off interest rate). A project is considered desirable if the IRR
is equal or bigger than a minimum acceptable interest rate defined by the investor
1[Fin85, MR11].
Levelized Cost
The levelized cost is the cost per unit of output taking into account the time pattern
(discounting) of costs as in the NPV [Pfa12a, Pfa12b].











References: [Fra12, Fra13, Pfa12a, Pfa12b]
Where:
I0 = initial investment costs at a time period (t=0),
n = number of years (e.g. project lifetime),
Ca = annual costs (after t=0),
Pel = annual electricity production,
r = discount rate,
t = time of payment (e.g. project year).
Calculating the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) for an investment in a generation
plant, represents the minimum price of electricity which is required to make the invest-
ment in the project viable. The LCOE is a commonly used figure for the assessment
and the comparison of investing in different electricity production technologies (e.g.
conventional, and renewable plants).
A summary of the discussed financial evaluation methods (NPV,IRR and LCOE) is
shown in table 4.6. The following section will consider the variation of these evalua-
tion methods, in case selected sensitivity parameters are changed for selected RES-E
technologies.
1 Which varies from investor to another, and can represents investing in other options of the same
risk level.
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3.2 Risk on Investment in a Liberalized Electricity
Market
Type of Risks faced by investors in 
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F gu e 3.3: I ves ment Risk i a Liberalized RES-E Market
Source: Author’s illus ration b sed o information provided in [GBH10] & [FBH13]
The market changes after liberalization have an impact on the risks faced by in-
vestors. Figure 3.3 illustrate the different risk types faced in liberalized electricity
markets. There are three major risk categories: price risks, technical risks and finan-
cial risks. These three main categories have an effect on the revenues and costs of the
project through different risk factors. Regarding price risk, revenues can be affected
by the changes in the electricity prices, and costs can be affected by the fuel prices.
For the technical risks, revenues can be affected by the uncertainties in the lifetime
of the project or technology type maturity. Uncertainties in estimating the resources
availability (e.g. Wind forecasting for a wind generation plant) also can be a possible
risk factor affecting the revenues. In addition, quantity related risks due to uncertainty
in the dispatchability of production (operation side risk factor), or regulatory legisla-
tive changes, can influence the revenues. Technical risk factors on costs are mainly
due to the uncertainties in the investment, operation or decommission costs. Financial
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risks on revenues are due to contractual risks or taxes. Costs under the financial risks
category can be affected by the changes in the debt or equity financial figures as the
interest rate, shares, or required payback time.
Each of these risk factors have different impact on the RES-E Investment and oper-
ation, which can lead to a significant change in the investment wellness in renewable
technologies and have an effect on the plant operation behaviour, and RES-E integra-
tion in the market as well.
In order to assess the different impacts of these risks, a sensitivity analysis of a
selected risk factors impact on various indicators is done in the next section.
Sensitivity analysis of risk factors Impacts
The sensitivity analysis scenario included the change of selected parameters in each
case, with a range of change from ± 30%. RETScreen wind and PV case studies
[RET13a] are used for the analysis, with modifications in the financial and project
input data in order to be up to date to the current German market situation. The
criteria of selecting the parameters is based on covering the three major risk categories
(price, technological and financial), and focusing on the risk factors that will be used
under the study scope in the next chapters.
RETScreen international overview: RETScreen is an international clean energy
project analysis software developed in 1996 by the Natural Resources Canada’s Canmet
Energy Research Center. It can be used to prepare both pre-feasibility and feasibility
analysis, specially addressing this issue by providing quick and valid results at low
cost on which ”go/no-go” decision can be made. RETScreen also provides a renew-
able energy projects database for different technologies and locations around the world
[RET05].
Independent reviews of RETScreen and comparisons with other project analysis
software reported accurate results from RETScreen. For example a study [Gau08]
explored RETScreen and HOMER models in comparison with SunSim (Matlab based
software). The study found that PV energy output for the location of the study
is underestimated by 6-9% by HOMER, and 0-6% by RETScreen for the locations
simulated, compared to a ”best case” SunSim model. Other studies can be found
as well related to the accuracy of the free model in comparison with other software
packages like[Gil07] and others.
RETScreen has five step analysis model and includes updated climate database ex-
panded to 4700 ground-stations and NASA satellite dataset integrated in the software,
in addition to products database and case studies.
Wind case study
• The yearly average wind speed of the plant(m/s).
• Debt interest rate(%).
• Electricity feed-in tariff(e/MWh)
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• Plant capacity factor(%).
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Figure 3.4: Wind NPV sensitivity results
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Figure 3.5: Wind LCOE sensitivity results



















  A v e r a g e  W i n d  s p e e d  ( L ) D e b t  I n t e r e s t  r a t e  ( L ) E l e c t r i c i t y  f e e d - i n  t a r i f f ( L ) C a p a c i t y  f a c t o r  ( t u r b i n e  a v a l i b i l i t y )  ( L )   A v e r a g e  w i n d  s p e e d  ( N P V ) D e b t  I n t e r e s t  r a t e  ( N P V ) E l e c t r i c i t y  f e e d - i n  t a r i f f ( N P V ) C a p a c i t y  f a c t o r  ( t u r b i n e  a v a l i b i l i t y )  ( N P V )











- 3 5 0
- 3 0 0
- 2 5 0
- 2 0 0
- 1 5 0











NPV value change (%)
Figure 3.6: Wind sensitivity analysis results represented as change in (%) for the NPV
& LCOE
The Net Present value (NPV) calculates the expenses for investment and operation
during the lifetime of the plant and calculates the incomes by discounting to the same
reference point [Fra12]. However that the energy policy have no influence on the average
wind speed (which make it unconsidered in the RES-E policy analysis studies), it is
important to note that the average wind speed change has a dramatic effect on the
project economic feasibility.
A slight change of the mean wind speed have a remarkable impact on the NPV
resulting in a range of change from -240% to 267% as shown in figure 3.6. The change
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in the capacity factor (which can be due to technical reasons like turbine availability
or RES-E policy reasons like curtaining the plant output in case of negative electricity
prices ) has an important impact on the project revenues (the same impact caused by
the feed-in tariff). This is represented by a change in the NPV from -115% to +115% as
shown in figure 3.6. Such impact makes the capacity factor and feed-in tariff important
points of analysis in the effect of different RES-E support mechanisms on investment.
The debt interest rate change influence is the smallest among the study parameters
(NPV changes from -15% to +14%), in addition it can’t be directly influenced by the
RES-E support mechanisms, but it can’t be neglected as a factor taken into account
in the decision making process from the investor prospective.
The levelized cost is the cost of producing a unit output (in this case MWh of
electricity)[Pfa12a]. The average wind speed has a significant effect on the levelized
cost with a change in values between -41% and +166.5% as shown in figure 3.6. For the
capacity factor change the levelized cost changes between -23% and +42.8%. Increasing
the capacity factor almost have the same effect increasing the average wind speed,
however decreasing the capacity factor have less impact than the average wind speed
on the levelized cost. The debt interest rate and the electricity feed-in tariff don’t
follow the same pattern (as the case in the NPV analysis), this is because changing the
feed-in tariff will affect the project revenues but not the cost of electricity production
(the change in levelized cost is 0% due to the feed-in tariff), on the other hand changing
the debt rate will affect the cash flow of the project and the electricity production cost.
The result of change in levelized cost is due to changing the debt rate between -15%
and +14%, this is the same as the effect on the NPV.
Figure 3.6 shows the wind case study sensitivity analysis results. The levelized cost
scale point 0% represents 67.39 (e/MWh). The Net Present Value(NPV)scale point
0% represents 3.755 (Million e).
PV case study
• The project lifetime (year).
• Debt interest rate (%).
• Debt term -payback time of the debt share- (year).
• Electricity feed-in tariff (e/MWh)
• Plant capacity factor(%).
The feed-in tariff and the capacity factor follow the same pattern in the NPV analysis
(explained in section 3.2) and the change in the NPV value is between -136% and
+136% as shown in figure 3.9. Changes in the project lifetime can be due to technical
aspects regarding the PV plant components lifetime, or economic reasons such as the
plant is no longer profitable for operation. The effect of project lifetime change on the
NPV is in the range between -89.5% and +61%. A debt financial detail plays a role
in the investment, the debt rate and term both affects the NPV. The debt rate has
a higher impact than the debt term, as the change in NPV due to the debt rate is
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Figure 3.7: PV NPV sensitivity results
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Figure 3.8: PV LCOE sensitivity results
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Figure 3.9: PV sensitivity analysis results represented as change in (%) for the NPV &
LCOE
between -20.9% and +21% and for the debt term it is between -19% and +15.7% as
illustrated in figure 3.9.
Figure 3.9 shows the pv case study sensitivity analysis results. The levelized cost
scale point 0% represents 356.33 (e/MWh). The Net Present Value(NPV)scale point
0% represents 1.38744 (Million e).
The major impact on the levelized cost is due to the capacity factor and the project
lifetime which can be changed due to technical reasons, economic reasons, or political
reasons in case of capacity factor (as explained in section 3.2). The change in the
levelized cost is between -23% and +42.8% (as shown in figure 3.9) due to the impact
of capacity factor change. The levelized cost change range is smaller for project lifetime
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as it is between -11.7% and 24.5%. The debt rate and term both have almost the same
range of effect (between -5 % and +6%) on the levelized cost, but the correlation
between the increase and decrease of levelized cost values is due to changing the debt
rate and term vies versa as seen in 3.8. The feed-in tariff does not have an effect on
the levelized cost (as highlighted in the wind case section 3.2).
Sensitivity Analysis Conclusions
The First conclusion on the sensitivity analysis for the wind and PV case studies is
that the project feasibility is affected with many risk factors. The major factors are the
resource assessment accuracy (the average wind speed in the wind case), the capacity
factor and the electricity feed-in tariff. Project lifetime has less effect than the previous
mentioned factors but it has to be taken into consideration as an important factor in
the analysis of different mechanisms design, as policy can have an effect on the decision
of whether operating a plant is still profitable or not due to political changes. Debt
financial details (interest rate and payback term) have the lowest impact on the project
feasibility; however they can not be neglected as a factor of study in the policy analysis.
As for second conclusion, the study shows that different project economic feasibility
tools have to be used in the evaluation, as the levelized cost of electricity can’t indicate
the effect of changing the feed-in tariff (as it has an influence on the project revenues
not costs) but the net present value (NPV) has identified the effect clearly.
The third conclusion is that the RES-E policy can only influence a limited number of
risk factors faced by the RES-E investors, as it can only deal with a few factors under
the price and quantity risk categories.
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3.3 RES-E Policy and Support Mechanisms
3.3.1 Why do RES-E Needs Regulatory Intervention and Support
Mechanisms?
The comparatively higher cost of RES-E technologies as well as the impacts on the
grid structure and system dispatchability, have made it virtually impossible for them
to grow in competitive with conventional technologies without intervention [BPAZB12].
The attractiveness of Investment in such technologies has to be companied with long-
term stability, risk mitigation instruments and electricity cost reduction. Especially
for the non-dispatchable RES-E technologies like wind and solar where the generation
resource can be hardly influenced by the power plant operators due to environmental
externalities, which tends to be a disadvantage compared to conventional technologies.
Therefore, there is a case for energy policy to correct those externalities [WM12].
In general renewable energy policies principally aim to increase the installed capacity
of renewable energy, in order to achieve the ambitious targets of the renewable energy
shares in the future energy mix. The main objectives of a RES-E support mechanism
have to encourage the deployment of Variety of RES-E technologies and improve it’s
learning curves. As it is never clear which technology or technological mix will provide
an efficient and reliable future of energy systems with high shares of RES.[BPAZB12].
Different EU scenarios proposing the share of the renewable energy participation
into final energy consumption is in continues increase, this means that the market has
to adapt high shares of renewable energy into its structure, in addition that incentives
have to be defined to create the path way for the installation of the capacity required.
3.3.2 RES-E Support Mechanisms in the German Electricity
Market
Germany experienced changes in the RES-E policy and support mechanisms since it
started in 1991 . The historical timeline of the renewable energy policy development
in Germany between the year 1991 and 2006 is presented in Figure 3.10.
Figure 3.10: RES policy timeline in Germany
Source:[Eco08b]
FeedIn-Tariff, StrEG (1991-2000) mechanism was introduced as a single fixed
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feed-in tariff for all RES-E technologies [Eco08b]. It required the supply companies to
buy the renewable energy generation at 90% of the average electricity price charged to
customer in the previous year[BN08]. In the year 2000 the StrEG was changed with
the feedin-tariff Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG) mechanism.
FeedIn-Tariff (EEG) (2000-present)
In the year 2000 under the Renewable Energy Act (EEG), the StrEG was replaced with
the feedin-tariff(EEG). It provided a guranteed grid access for the RES-E electricity
production, in addition to a fixed technology specific feedin-tariff for a period of 20
years. The tariff was degrading on annual bases for the new installations in a certain
percentage [Eco08b]. For example for Wind energy the tariff was 9.1 ct/kWh the first 5
years of operation and for the subsequent 15 years was 6.19 ct/kWh. For installations
after 2002, the tariffs were reduced by nominal 1.5% for each subsequent year, in
order to give an incentive for early investment and to take advantage of technological
progress[BN08]. In 2004 new the mechanism was reviewed and a new tariff had been
adapted, in general the new remuneration was lower for Onshore Wind, higher PV
,bio-energies and geothermal. The tariff for Onshore Wind was up to 81.6 e/MWh for
five years after installation at least, with reduction in the tariff depending on yield of
system to 52.8 e/MWh. The annual reduction of tariff is 2%. For PV the tariff was
between 406 and 568 e/MWh, depending on yield of the plant size (installed capacity)
and whether it is a building integrated or ground installed. The annual reduction of
tariff is 5% in 2005 and 6.5% from 2006 on.[Eco08b]. Figure 3.11 illustrates the changes
in the Onshore Wind feedin-tariff, as can be seen the remuneration went down from
9.95 ct/kWh in the year 1991 to 7.65 ct/kWh in 2005. This implies a reduction by
23%[EEG10].
Figure 3.11: Development of the remuneration of electricity from onshore wind energy
in Germany (inflation-adjusted to values of 2005)
Source:[EEG10]
Currently as shown in figure 1.2 the feedin-tariff (EEG) exists including several EGG
amendment reviews, in parallel to the Market premium mechanism (described in the
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section below) currently in Germany. The amount of tariff for a given plant is the tariff
level as defined by law minus the degression rate, which depends on the year in which
the plant was put into operation. For Onshore Wind the amount of remuneration varies
between 4.87 and 8.93 ct/kWh according to the duration of payment, plus a bonus of
0.5 ct/kWh for repoweing and plant service bonus of 0.48 ct/kWh. For PV still the
remuneration depends on the installed capacity and the type of the plant whether it is
a building integrated or mounted systems or ground installed plans. The remuneration
level for PV from 1 january 2014 is defined as following based on the installed capacity2:
[LEG12]
• ≤ 10 kW: 13,68 ct/kWh
• ≤ 40 kW: 12,98 ct/kWh
• ≤ 1 MW: 11,58 ct/kWh
• Other systems ≤ 10 MW: 9,47 ct/kWh
Figure 3.12: Development of the share of Renewable energy in the total gross electricity
consumption in Germany
Source:[BMU12b]
Since 2000 the feedin-tariff under the Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG) had
a successful impact on the renewable energy deployment in general and the RES-E
shares in the total gross electricity consumption in particular as shown in figure 3.12.
The RES-E share in the final electricity consumption raised from 6.3 % in 2000 to
2 The current structure for the feedin-tariff can be found (in German language) in Federal Net-
work Agency (Bundesnetzagentur), website:www.bundesnetzagentur.de, under the EEG informa-
tion section
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14.8% in 2008 . Expressed in installed capacity, an addition of over 4900 MW of grid
connected solar PV capacity, and over 19000 MW of Wind power have been installed
between 2000 and 2008[CG10]. Currently the RES-E share in total gross electricity
consumption reached 23.6% in the year 2012 [BMU12b].
That is why it is important to mention that the Germany feedin-tariff represents
perhaps the most widely recolonized and commonly cited successful example of a feedin-
tariff policy [CG10].
German market premium
The market premium was introduced in the 2012 amendment of the Renewable Energy
Sources Act (EEG) aiming to give an incentive of demand oriented electricity produc-
tion and providing the operators with experience regarding the market dynamics and
prices. As mentioned before plant operators have the flexibility to choose between the
former feedin-tariff or the market premium since 01.01.2012, not as in the feedin-tariff
where the transmission system operators are responsible to sell the RES-E on the mar-
ket. Under the market premium operators have to directly market their electricity
production in the market. The reason that two parallel mechanism exist is that the
direct marketing may be challenging for some plants (e.g. small-scale installations).
The market premium dose not aim for creating a fundamental change in the RES sup-
port mechanisms, but rather to prepare the foundations for a future transition to a
market-based regime.[GP13a]
Figure 3.13: German Market Premium structure overview
Source:[GP13a]
Market premium structure is presented in figure 3.13. In the premium scheme op-
erators are paid the difference between a technology specific defined feedin-tariff and
the average market value of the generated electricity. In addition, operators receive a
management premium as a coverage for their direct participation in the market (e.g.
balancing or transaction costs). Electricity producers can choose to directly market
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their production under the direct marketing scheme and benefit from the of transmis-
sion priority and grid access rules with a possibility of having a higher or lower average
market value than the market premium scheme value as shown in figure 3.13.
In the premium scheme the remuneration amount is calculated as following:
MPRGross = FIT −MV +MMP (3.4)
Source: [GP13a]
Where:
MPRGross = Total premium in the premium scheme
FIT = Technology specific feedin-tariff
MV = The monthly technology specific average market value
MMP = Management premium
MPRGross is the total gross premium in the market premium scheme. FIT is the
technological specific regulated feedin-tariff a plant can claim. MV is the average mar-
ket value which is calculated on monthly ex post bases, based on the hourly prices
at the electricity stock exchange in Germany (EEX). For dispatchable RES-E tech-
nologies, the market value is the actual arithmetic average of the hourly prices in the
market. But for Wind and PV a technology, specific relative market value is used
in stead of the arithmetic average value and this is because of the difference in the
production times between Wind and PV. Wind energy is frequently produced at times
when the demand is low, so the electricity prices are low as well. On the other hand,
Solar energy is generated frequently at a peak demand time at noon when prices are
high. The difference between the FIT and the MV (FIT-MV) is called the Market net
premium (MPRnet). MMP is the management premium, it distinguishes between dis-
patchable and non-dispatchable RES-E technologies in order to account for the costs
of balancing forecasting errors.
Table 3.2: Management premium rates and the management premium ordinance
(MaPrV) 2012
Source:[GP13b]
Table 3.2 shows the management premium rates according to EEG 2012. There is
a yearly decrease in the management premium as it can be seen, as well it can be
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clearly seen that Wind and PV revives significantly higher premium than the dispatch-
able technologies. It can also be seen that the new management premium ordinance
(MaPrV) creates an incentive for creating a capability in Wind and PV plants to be
remotely controlled with higher management premium than the other plants, which
will have a positive reflection on the congestion management problem of the grid, and
give more flexibility for the curtailment of production if needed, in the existence of
high share of RES-E fluctuating wind and pv shares.
3.3.3 RES-E Support Mechanisms Interaction with Risk
Regarding RES-E investment, the interaction between the policy and investment can
be described using the simple model in figure 3.14. Policy can influence the risk-return
consideration of RES-E investment. As investors rationally weigh the level of risk and
return of a possible investment option, and pick those options that provides the best
return for a given level of risk. In other words, investors compare different investment
opportunities through evaluating their risk-adjusted returns.[WM12]
Figure 3.14: Simple model of renewable energy policy and investment
Source:[WM12]
Although that policy can not interact or mitigate the different risk factors faced by
investment and operation in the market illustrated in figure 3.3. But the structure
of the support mechanism can influence dramatically the investment and operation.
The policy features can shape two risk categories, first the policy risks and second the
quantity risks.
As illustrated in figure 3.15, not all the risk factors under the price and quantity risk
categories can be influenced or mitigated by RES-E policy. The risk factors which can
be influenced are represented by the coloured blocks under each category.
Regarding price risks, the electricity feed-in tariff and CO2 prices are the risk factors
which can be influenced by the policy. The fuel prices are not considered in that case
as there is no fuel prices for RES-E technologies like Wind and PV.
Regarding quantity risks, policy can not interact with all the risk factors under this
risk category. But it can influence the uncertainty in utilization level related factors,
which represents the risk factors on the operation side. like the feed-in ability and
timing into the grid and the long-term guaranteed purchasing contracts for renewable
electricity. In addition, policy can mitigate the regulatory risk that can take place due
to legislative changes.
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Figure 3.15: RES-E policy interaction with risks faced by investment and operation in
a lib ralized energy market
Source: Author’s illustration based on information provided in [FBH13]
Those risk factors that can be influenced by RES-E policy will play a major rule
in the analysis of the implication of the support mechanism on the investment and
operation in the next chapter.
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3.4 Risk Economic Evaluation Approaches
There are different attempts to quantify investment risks, however all of them need a
clear picture of the risk factors affecting a project. As mentioned before in section 3.1,
a financial evaluation of investment is a logical approach for measuring the feasibility
of a project. Different methods are available for such an evaluation [GX04], such as:
• Value-at-Risk (or profit-at-risk)
• Scenario analysis
• Required green price calculations
Each of these methods has advantages and disadvantages that needs to be evaluated.
Taking into consideration the final target of building the model, other market actors
involved in the assessment rather than investors, and the level of complexity required
in the evaluation.
3.4.1 Value-at-Risk (VaR)
Monte Carlo analysis has been introduced to the cash flow analysis to build distri-
bution functions for each factor which is subjected to uncertainty and can be a risk
factor. In such analysis a large number of calculations are made. For each calculation
a new set of input data from the distribution function is used as an input for calcu-
lating different financial indicators [GX04]. It can simply be explained defining using
the Monte Carlo analysis methodology as calculating a desired financial instrument
like the NPV through selecting the quantities for the variables needed to calculate it,
based on the distribution functions of these variables. The distribution function shape
of the calculated NPV in that case will be defined based on the distribution shape of
the variables used to calculate it. A number of selections and calculations are done
and each calculation results in a value for the NPV. Then characterizing a cumulative
probability function is possible by ranking the outcomes (from smaller to larger). The
expected value is given at the end by the median value of a distribution function, so
the expected NPV will be the corresponding value to the 50% cumulative probability
(NPV at (P=50%)) as shown in the example in figure 3.16.
The value-at-risk (VaR) can be calculated using the distribution function values, for
example for the NPV the VaR is calculated using the expected NPV (NPV at (P=50%))
minus the NPV corresponding value to the 10% cumulative probability NPV (P=10%).
Figure 3.16 gives an example of the Monte Carlo approach applied in a project
investment analysis case. In this case the expected NPV (NPV at (P=50%)) is 14
Million Euro. The Value-at-Risk (VaR) equals 14 Million Euro − (-10) Million Euro
(NPV (P=10%)) = 24 Million Euro, which gives an indication that such an investment
has a high risk probability of not being financially feasible and the probability of having
a below zero NPV is 30%.
What distinguish the Monte Carlo analysis approach is that it does not give only
a calculated financial outcome, but it allows also estimating the probability of each
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Figure 3.16: NPV results using Monte Carlo analysis.
Source:[GX04]
outcome of the calculated financial parameter. This can help the investment evaluation
to measure the probability of investment feasibility.
3.4.2 Scenario Analysis
What does the word scenario refers to?
A scenario is a possible direction which is defined by certain framework and assump-
tions. This direction can take place in the present or in the future. It is important to
mention that a future scenario is not a prediction, but it is rather a possible option
which can be adapted or not in the future. Scenario analysis refers to investigating
the consequences and results of following this direction in a defined framework and
conditions.
The analysis of different scenarios can be described as being simple in terms of
understanding, in addition of being more flexible in case of involving different market
actors than investors. In this approach, building up the scenario inputs is based on
estimations and assumptions not as in the case of the VaR which uses a distribution
function for each risk parameter. It is important to define clearly the assumptions
made in different scenarios (constant parameters, variables approximations, framework
conditions,...).
In this approach each scenario represents an input which is fed into the model used
to do the calculations and produce an outcome of the different financial parameters.
It is easier than in VaR to define a certain framework conditions for the analysis (for
example selecting a RES-E technology and support mechanism in a certain market or
country), and to adapt the model to calculate the required financial parameters needed
for the investment evaluation. Due to the simple and clear approach of the scenario
analysis, it allows to analyze the impact of a certain parameters variation included in
the scenario. This can help to understand the influence weight of specific factors on
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the evaluation outcome. In addition to give an impression about the direction this
scenario can lead to if it is adapted.
It is clear that the main drawback of the scenario analysis is that it does not provide
any information regarding the probability of events or risks. Table 3.3 gives an overview
of the advantages and disadvantages of the various approaches mentioned above.
Advantages Disadvantages
Scenario analysis • Simple method • May overestimate risk




• Both risk and it’s proba-
bility is measured
• Complex
• Can calculate the proba-
bility of loss/inadequate fi-
nancial returns
• Requires information on
distribution of certain input
Table 3.3: Advantages and disadvantages of different investment risk analysis method.
Source:[GX04]
3.4.3 Why using a simple scenario analysis method for the policy
implication evaluation?
• The scenario analysis method is selected in order to take advantage of the sim-
plicity and flexibility to include different study parameters in each scenario case.
• It is important to distinguish between the level of information needed for eval-
uating a scenario by politations and by investors. Politations are interested in
the evaluation indicators which reflect the directions that different scenarios can
lead to. The scenario analysis methodology can fulfill such a purpose in a simple
understandable and straight forward manner. In addition, any changes in the
scenario framework can be adapted and the consequences of such a change can
be reflected on a discrete indicators which can be compared with other scenarios
results quantitatively. So conclusions regarding the result direction a scenario
can lead for, can be easily driven using the scenario analysis method. On the
other hand, investors may be more interested in more details regarding the indi-
cators used for the investment evaluation like the probability of the risk, which
can provide the investor with additional information needed for his evaluation.
• Some companies use highly sophisticated models to assess such scenarios, many
others assess them in a relatively simple way. A simplified investment analysis
can provide a similarly approximate level of information about the prospects for
investment in response to different forms of incentives [GBH10].
• It is not practical or necessarily appropriate for policy makers to attempt to
second guess the investment decision of private companies (or different types of
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investors) in details. Different companies may make different investment decision
even when they are faced with the same market conditions [GBH10].
The scenario analysis method is selected for modelling the support mechanisms im-
plications on market actors in the RESMIP model, which will be discussed in the
following chapter.
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4 Modelling of RES-E Support
Mechanisms Implications
Chapter 3 built the foundation for the understanding of the important major aspects
which is needed for The assessment of the impact of different RES-E support mecha-
nisms on Investment and power plant operation in the electricity market. Regarding
the investor side a clear understanding of three major aspects is needed. First, the
process in which investors bases their decision upon. Second, dealing with uncertain-
ties and the impact of different risk types on investment economic feasibility. Third,
as support mechanisms can’t have an influence on all investment risk factors, a clear
understanding on the interference between the RES-E support mechanisms and these
factors is necessary through answering the following question; Can RES-E support
mechanism influence or mitigate the risk impact? As for the power plant operation,
the understating of incentives for operating behaviour changing is important.
The following chapter will explain how this understanding can be translated into a
defined and clear analysis methodology, for the evaluation and quantification of how a
change in RES-E support mechanism can possibly influence investment and operation
for different RES-E technologies.
4.1 RESMIP Model
The core objective of the model is to analyze the implications of different RES-E
support mechanisms on investment and plant operation.
RESMIP (RES-E Support Mechanisms implications on Investment and Plant Opera-
tion) model is a scenario analysis based model. The model is developed for the analysis
of the RES-E support mechanisms impact on investment and operation through adapt-
ing different scenarios for certain RES-E support mechanisms and technologies.
Each scenario framework is defined by selecting a support mechanism and a RES-
E technology. The selected support mechanism is evaluated qualitatively in order to
build a profile for the risk factors that can influence investment and operation. This
evaluation is translated into defined quantities related to investment decision making
and operation behaviour. Using these quantities an economic analysis is done for
the pre-selected RES-E technologies in the scenario. This economic analysis is based
on running a case study for each scenario. The output of the economic analysis is
then compared to a reference scenario and conclusion regarding the implication of the
support mechanism on the selected RES-E technology can be driven from the results
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of the comparison. Several model runs take place based on the number of scenarios
need to investigated.
The following sections will clarify the general description of the model structure, and
the different analysis methodologies used. In order to reach a high level of transparency
in the model, a detailed description of any relevant assumptions for each stage will be
highlighted clearly in the relevant sections.
4.1.1 Model Structure
The interaction between the different stages is illustrated in figure 4.1, as can be seen
the model structure is defined by five main stages:
1. Scenario framework and conditions
2. Qualitative support mechanism assessment
3. Quantitative scenario assessment
4. Economic analysis
5. Comparison and results
Each scenario investigation means a model run with the involvement of the five stages.
The model run starting stage is the scenario framework and conditions, going though
the three following stage to end with the scenario comparison and results stage. It is a
finish to start model meaning that each stage have to be finished in order to start the
next stage.
The model general assumptions are stated below. These assumptions don’t vary
from scenario to another, it is applicable on all the scenarios investigated using the
RESMIP model.
Model general assumptions:
• The analysis is focusing on the electricity market in Germany.
• No investment portfolio effects are taken into consideration in the investment
evaluation
• The support mechanism reference scenario is the regulated feed-in Tariff for both
Onshore Wind and PV.
• Technology investment risk is not represented by a separate variable in the model
(as the focus of the study is only on two technologies). But it is included in the
financial assumption related to each technology like the debt to equity share and
required rates of return.
• Operation and Maintenance cost in the economic analysis is defined as following
Euro/MWh production for Wind Onshore
Euro/kWp installed for Solar PV
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• Investors want to compensate for the risk or uncertainties, even if the possibility
of them to happen is very low. They always want to make the investment secured
and plan for the worst case scenario through higher requirements wherever an
uncertainty exist.
4.1.2 Scenario Framework and Conditions
In this stage defining the scenario framework is done through the selection of two main
variable parameters: RES-E technology and RES-E support mechanism.
Stage assumptions:
• The scope of RES-E technologies included in the analysis is Wind Onshore and
Solar PV.
• The scope of RES-E support mechanisms included in the scope of the analysis
are:
– Feed-In Tariff (FIT)
– Market premium ex-post
– Market Premium ex-ante
– Capacity Payment
• Each of these support mechanisms is analyzed under a regulatory defined scheme
and auctioning scheme, and the related assumptions are defined in the relative
stage.
4.1.3 Qualitative Support Mechanism Assessment
The first analysis stage after defining the scenario is to analyze qualitatively the selected
support mechanism. This analysis is done through four main steps:
1. Highlighting the pros and cons
Evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of the selected mechanism. In
this stage the analysis is done for all market actors and for all types of risks
and the uncertainties that can be produced by the selected mechanism. It is a
general evaluation which can be done by literature review for different point of
views regarding the selected mechanism or by market surveys on different types
of market actors for empirical evaluation. Through combining both theoretical
and empirical analysis, the optimum evaluation output is created. Empirical
evaluation is not included in the research scope due to time constrains. On the
other hand, a large number of literature include empirical approach and surveys
are available which is enough for the scope of the study and the evaluation of
the selected mechanism ([BN08, BPAZB12, GP13a, KNB08, Eco08a, EEG10,
REN13, bde13]
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Figure 4.1: REMIP model structure
Source: Author’s illustration
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2. Identifying the risk factors affecting investment and operation
In the first step, a general analysis has been carried out to give a complete
picture regarding the selected mechanism. In the current step extracting the risk
factors is the main objective. Focusing on price related risks and quantity related
risks. The price risk factors have a direct influence on investment, and quantity
risk has an influence on both investment and operation.
Step assumptions:
• Only price and quantity risk factors are taking into consideration in this
step as the policy can not have a direct influence on other risk categories
(financial risks and other technical risks ) as explained in 3.3.3.
Risk profile
Risk factors have different perceptions from both investment and operations sides.
This means that the influence of a certain risk can have a higher or lower rank. In this
step the risk evaluation is done based on two main parameters: probability of risk to
take place during the project lifetime, and the impact of the risk factor on the related
market actor.
A detailed view for the different risk factors evaluation with focusing on investment
and operation, are the final outcome of the support mechanism assessment stage. This
is represented in the risk matrix of each scenario. The matrix is a representation for
the different risk levels using the probability and impact to identify the risk category
(low-medium-high).
Step assumptions:
• Different types of investors have totally different risk perceptions (which is hard
to be estimated without empirical analysis). This evaluation tries to focus on
small and medium types of investors as they represent a high share of renewable
energy investment in Germany.
• The impact of the different risk factors evaluation is based on the sensitivity
analysis in chapter 3.
• Regarding the price risk factors, the probability of risk is estimated from the
support mechanism. As for the quantity risk factors the probability of risk is
calculated using the likelihood of production curtailing, based on the market
electricity prices.
• Evaluation for both probability and impact is done from a scale from 1 to 5 (1 is
for very low and 5 is very high) .
4.1.4 Quantitative Scenario Assessment
Linking the risk profile built from the support mechanism analysis to how the invest-
ment decision is made and how the plant operation will be effected, require a defined
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modelling parameters that can translate the risk factors from the outcome of a quali-
tative assessment to defined quantities related to the investment decision making and
the affected possible factors regarding the plant operation. Such a translation is done
using financial instruments and operational variables that allows the calculation of the
different risk levels effects both investment and operation sides.
Investment (equity) perspective
Investment orientation toward profit maximization (as explained in chapter 2) means
that the acceptance of higher risk requires higher profit. Risk does not come without
a price. How to compensate for different risk levels depends on the perception of the
investor towards risk. Investment combined with high uncertainty is translated into
an increase in the required return to accept the risk, and generate secured profits in
the future cash flows. consequently this can lead to higher required selling prices for
customers, or results in a conclusion that the risk have to be compensated with very
high costs that makes the investment infeasible.





Table 4.1: Required return on investment (equity) for different RES-E technologies in
the German market.
Source: [Fra13]
An example is shown in table 4.1. As can be seen the required return rate varies
from one RES-E technology to another. This is due to the different risk levels related
to each RES-E technology. For example investing in Wind offshore are more risky that
onshore and this is reflected in the return rate which is 14.0% for wind offshore and
9.0% for wind onshore.
Bank’s (debt) perspective
In current RES-E investments in wind and solar power plants, the share of debt is
much higher than the privet investment equity share. Table 4.2 shows an example for
the share of debt to equity in Germany for Wind onshore and PV, as shown the debt
to equity share for wind onshore is between 70% to 75% and for PV is 80%. It is
important to note that the renewables projects financing is developed in an off-balance
sheet agreement and both debt and equity investors rely on the project future cash
flows[FBH13]. The security of paying back loans is the main risk bank faces, therefore
banks try to remove all kind of risks that can influence the incoming future cash flow.
This is done with restrictions on the maintenance programs to be coordinated in a
way that does not have a big influence on the plant production, and also asking for
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insurance to cover the cost of machine failure and loss of production [GX04]. Financial
measurements are used to evaluate whether a project will be able to fulfill with the
payback requirements or not. The main measurement is the Debt Service Coverage
Ratio (DSCR)1.
RES-E Technology Reference Share of debt to equity
Wind Onshore BMU(2011) 75.0%
Frauenhofer ISE (2012,2013) 70.0%
Deutshe Winguard (2012) 75.0%
PV Small Frauenhofer ISE (2012,2013) 80.0%
PV Large Frauenhofer ISE (2012,2013) 80.0%
Table 4.2: Share of debt to equity for different RES-E technologies in the German
market
Dealing with higher risk and uncertainty from banks perception can be done in many
aspects:
• Requiring higher DSCR is one of the strategies to compensate for high uncer-
tainty.
• Higher interest rate is a strategy to deal with higher risks, using the same per-
ception of the investor.
• Limiting the debt to equity ratio for different technologies due to technical risks
is another strategy to deal with the risk of the DSCR, this means that a higher
equity share is required. From the banks perception this limitation will decrease
the loan repayment and hence increase the DSCR to an acceptable level. On
the other hand, the required rate of return on equity is always higher than the
debt[MR11], and this can have an influence on the overall economic feasibility of
the investment.
The Weighted Average Cost of Capital
The weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is used when an investment capital is
financed by more than on entity, as in our case equity and debt. As each entity has it’s
share of capital and required return on it, the WACC is used to determine the average
cost for the investment capital for both equity and debt. It represents the necessary
rate required by a prospective investor for investment in a new plant [Eco11][SEI04].
The WACC can be either used as the discount rate for calculating the Net Present
Value (NPV) or other financial figures like LCOE or IRR in an investment analysis.
Or some firm’s use the WACC as an overall representation of a minimum value for the
internal rate of return (IRR) of a new project [GBH10].
1The debt service coverage ratio is the the amount of cash flow available to meet the annual loan
obligations (for more details please check section 4.1.5 )
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Based upon the same approach of the developed model in Green-x [GX04], which is
used in several studies ([SEI04, Eco11, GX04]) for linking the WACC and the project
risk level, the WACC is calculated in RESMIP model as following:
WACC = gd × rd + ge × re. (4.1)
Where:
gd = Share of debt,
rd = Debt rate of return,
ge = Share of equity,
re = Equity rate of return.
Each variable that defines the WACC can be determined through different ways
which will lead to a different result. Estimating the value of parameters like the equity
rate of return depends on the selected model of calculation. Determining the debt
return rate is done based on the market conditions (which will vary from one county
to another). Also assumptions for variables like the debt to equity share varies from
one technology to another as shown in table 4.2.
The following subsections will discuss into details how each WACC variable is deter-
mined in the RESMIP model.
Return on equity (re)
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is a used financial model that expresses
the relation between the investment risk (which is viewed in comparison with other
investment opportunities) and the required return. The CAPM quantifies the addi-
tional required return (or risk premium) for accepting a certain risk, and provides a
risk-return relationship based on the basic idea that only market risk matters, as mea-
sured by the β factor (which will be explained in details later) . In the CAPM the
required return rate Rie is the sum of a risk-free rate plus a risk premium and can be
calculated as following:
Rie = Rfe + β × (Rme −Rfe). (4.2)
Where:
Rie = Required return rate,
Rfe = Risk free rate,
β = Risk measurement factor,
Rme = Average return in the financial market,
(Rme −Rfe) = Market risk premium.
In the CAPM model, three main quantities are needed to calculate the required
return rate. First, the risk free rate (Rf ) which varies from country to another and can
be extracted from yearly publications. Second, the market risk premium (Rm−Rf ) can
as well be estimated as a country specific value from yearly publications (e.g. [FL13]).
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Table 4.3 shows the risk free rate and market risk premium for different countries. The
average risk free rate in Egypt is 12.7% , and it is 1.9% in Germany for the year 2013.
This can be due to the country economical and political situation difference between
countries, as they are more stable in Germany than the current situation in Egypt.
The average risk premium can vary as well on country bases, (due to the difference in
the normal (systematic) risk on investment between markets), for example the average
value of risk premium in Germany is 5.5%, and it is 6.8% for Finland for the year 2013.
Country Risk free rate (Rf ) Risk premium (Rm −Rf )
Egypt 12.7% 9.2%
Germany 1.9% 5.5%
United Kingdom 2.4% 5.5%
Sweden 2.3% 6%
Brazil 5.9 % 6.5%
Finland 1.7% 6.8%
India 6.9% 8.5%
Table 4.3: Average risk free rates (Rf ) and average market risk premiums (Rm − Rf )
for different countries in 2013
Source:[FL13]
Factor β can be estimated whether using equation 4.2 if other variables described in
the equation are known, or other calculation commonly used methods.
The required rate of return on equity is calculated using the Capital Asset Pricing
Model(CAPM) in the RESMIP model. However, an additional factor have been intro-
duced to the CAPM which represents the policy risk due to the support mechanism
implications. The support mechanism risk premium (aSM) changes based on the risk
evaluation done in the support mechanism analysis stage of the model. New β factor
for each scenario is then calculated with according to the following definition:
βSM = aSM × βref . (4.3)
Where:
βSM = The new β for the selected support mechanism in the scenario,
aSM = Support mechanism risk premium,
βref = The β factor of the reference scenario.
Based on the βSM calculations and the other variables, the required rate of return
on equity re can be calculated for each scenario case.
re = Rfe + βSM × (Rme −Rfe) = Rfe + (βref × aSM)× (Rme −Rfe). (4.4)
Where:
re = Equity rate of return,
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Rfe = Risk free rate,
βSM = The new β for the selected support mechanism in the scenario,
aSM = Support mechanism risk premium,
βref = The β factor of the reference scenario,
Rme = Return in the financial market for equity,
(Rme −Rfe) = Market risk premium for equity.
Debt required rate of return (rd)
The debt rate of return is estimated in the model based on the currently used debt
rates in the German RES-E market. Various RES-E technologies have different debt
rates based on the risk associated with the technology type. The reason why there is a
technology based difference in the required rate is depending on the risk level associated
with the RES-E technology from the bank prospective. Table 4.4 shows the debt rates
in Germany for the different RES-E technologies.
RES-E Technology Reference Debt required rate
Wind Onshore BMU(2011) 5 to 5.5%
Frauenhofer ISE (2012,2013) 5 to 5.5%
Deutche Winguard (2012) 5.5%
PV Small Frauenhofer ISE (2012,2013) 4.0%
PV Large Frauenhofer ISE (2013) 4.0%
Frauenhofer ISE (2012) 4.5%
Table 4.4: Debt required rate of return for different RES-E technologies in Germany
Sources: [FEL13, Win12, Fra12, Fra13]
As can be seen in the table, the debt required rate for Onshore Wind varies between
5% to 5.5% depend on the reference. Regarding the PV it depends on the size of the
plant. For the small PV and building integrated plants it is 4.0%, for large ground
installed plants it is around 4.5% (in 2012).
Variables like the risk free rate (rfd) and market risk premium (rpd) for debt
2 can be
used to calculate the debt return rate (rd) in case there is no data available about the
used rates in the market using the following definition:
rd = rfd + rpd. (4.5)
Where:
rd = Debt required rate of return,
rfd = Risk free rate for debt,
rpd = Market risk premium for debt.
2 The risk free rate can be the same for debt and equity. However, the market risk premium can be
different from equity and debt prospectives
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WACC Calculation Model in RESMIP
The weighted average cost of capital (WACC) defined on equation 4.1, can be redefined
using the explained definitions for the return on equity and debt in equations 4.4 and
4.5 as following:
WACC = gd× (rfd + rpd)× (1− rt) + ge× (Rfe + (βref × aSM)× (Rme−Rfe)). (4.6)
Where:
gd = Share of debt,
rfd = Risk free rate for debt,
rpd = Market risk premium for debt,
rt = Tax rate
3,
ge = Share of equity,
Rfe = Risk free rate,
βref = Equity risk measurement factor for the reference scenario,
aSM = Support mechanism risk premium,
Rme = Return in the financial market for equity,
(Rme −Rfe) = Market risk premium for equity.
Plant Operation Perspective
RES-E support mechanism can interact with plant operation through creating an in-
centive for operators to adapt a more demand oriented generation behaviour and react
to market signal. This incentive is created to reach the market integration of the RES-
E and the system integration as well. For non-dispatchable RES-E technologies like
Wind and PV, due to the nature of the resource availability generation can not be
influenced4. In that context if the operators have to react to market signals and be-
have more demand oriented this will mean curtailing the electricity production which
will affect the capacity factor of the plant. Reducing the capacity factor of the plant
will influence the revenues generation and this will be reflected on the financial in-
dicators of the economic evaluation of the project. This situation has an advantage
for the system stability and economic efficiency. In the RESMIP model, the effect of
the support mechanism on operation is translated to an impact on the plant capacity
factor. How the capacity factor is affected depends on the support mechanism evalu-
ation done in the previous analysis stage, it is directly related to the quantity risk level.
There are different approaches to define the operation and maintenance (O&M) costs
for Wind onshore and PV. These approaches are mainly to define the O&M costs as a
fixed cost per year, or as a variable cost with the changes of production. As clarified
3 The reason why the tax rate appears in the debt side as (1 − rt) is that when interest is paid to
the bank, it is allowed to include that as an expense. And when it is included as an expense it
lower the taxes. However, the tax rate will not play a rule in the RESMIP model scenario analysis
calculations as it is not applicable on the Wind onshore and PV electricity production.
4 Unless it is curtailed by operators, which will reduce the generation
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before in the model general assumptions, the adapted approach in RESMIP model for
the O&M costs in case of Onshore Wind is the variable )O&M costs based on the of
amount of energy production (e/MWh). This approach is used in the model as it is a
commonly used approach for Wind and PV technologies, because wind turbines have
moving parts which is affected based on the production amount, but on the other hand
PV does not. The approach adapted in case of PV is the fixed O&M costs defined
based on the installed capacity (e/kWp).
This means that for Onshore Wind under different scenarios there is a possibility
for the O&M costs to change as a consequence of changing the plant production. This
change will affect the running costs during the life time of the project, which will be
reflected on the yearly cash flow and all the financial indicators specially the cost re-
lated ones like the LCOE. On the other hand, for the PV the O&M costs will not be
affected due to change in production.
Step assumptions:
• Plant operator will curtail the production at any value of a market negative price,
not only in the high negative prices cases where the remuneration is exhausted.
• O&M costs are defined for different RES-E technologies as clarified in the model
general assumptions.
4.1.5 The Economic Analysis
The first three stages define the assessment methodology used in the model. This is
done through selecting a scenario then applying a qualitative analysis, and translating
it’s results into quantities using descriptive calculation models for both investment and
operation sides. The main objective of the current stage is to reflect the previous
analysis implications on real projects using different case studies. Selected financial
figures are used to measure the project feasibility for both equity and debt sides, in
addition to reflect the consequences of changing the plant operation.
The Case Studies
For each RES-E technology including in the study scope, a selected generation plant
that represents a case study. The selection of the case studies is based on the three pa-
rameters: Plant installed capacity, the availability of project information and the plant
location. The qualitative analysis results are used as inputs for the project financial
informations (e.g. the discount rate of the future cashflow, the electricity feed-in tariff,
the debt and equity related values) and technical conditions (e.g. the plant capacity
factor and O&M costs). Based on plant case study the financial indicators are calcu-
lated for each scenarios and used in the assessment of the scenario results5.
Step assumptions:
5 More details regarding the selected case studies in the scope of the study are included in section
(4.2).
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• As it will be challenging to estimate the change in all the variables (like how
much remuneration is paid for the capacity available) specially for the future
support mechanism scenarios. The case studies will be used to measure the effect
of the changed variables due to the price and quantity risks in comparison to the
reference scenario (like the WACC, re, gd, rd, Capacity factor, O&M costs) as
this is the main scope of the study.
The Analysis Financial Indicators
Four financial measurement are selected in the economic analysis
• The Net Present Value (NPV)
• The Levelized Cost of Electricity (LCOE)
• The internal Rate of Return on equity (IRR)
• The debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
Except for the DSCR, other financial measurements are calculated as explained in
chapter 3. As clarified before, the NPV is selected as it reflects the investment economic
feasibility including revenues and costs over the project lifetime. In addition based on
it other financial measurements can be calculated like the IRR. The IRR is used as an
understandable figure for investors to evaluate the investment using a minimum desired
rate of return and comparing it to the calculated IRR. The LCOE is selected as it is
a commonly used figure for the assessment and comparison of investing in different
electricity production technologies.
The DSCR is a main measurement used by the bank which is defined as:
DSCR = CF/(LR + I). (4.7)
Source: Green-x 2004 [GX04]
Where:
CF = The annual available cash flow of the project (net operating income before
depreciation, debt payments and income taxes),
(LR+ I) = The annual loan obligation plus the required interest rate (debt service).
The DSCR is the annual available cashflow from the net operating income divided
by the debt service which is the debt repayment annual obligations [Eco08a, WP98].
It is calculated for each year of the project lifetime and the lowest ratio is reported as
the DSCR of the project[RET05] .
Banks are not so much interested whether a project is profitable, as much as they
want to make sure that they will get their loan repayment obligations payment back.
As there is a strong link between the project profitability and the available cash flow,
the bank requires a minimum DSCR to finance a project. A DSCR higher than 1%
means that there is enough cash flow to fulfill the payback obligations, however it
depends on the bank risk perception as explained before to evaluate the risk and set
the required DSCR for each project. Table 4.5 shows an example of the level of required
DSCR in different countries for various RES-E technologies.
49
Country Wind Onshore Wind Offshore Solar PV-Large Solar PV-Small
United Kingdom 1.45% 1.8% 1.45% 1.3%
Germany 1.3% 1.7% 1.3% 1.3%
Poland 1.45% 1.8% 1.45% 1.3%
Table 4.5: Debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) in different countries and various RES-E
technologies
Source:[Eco11]
AS can be seen in table 4.5 the required DSCR changes on the country scale for
the same RES-E technology like for Offshore wind in the UK (1.8%) and in Germany
1.7%). It also varies from RES-E technology to another depending on the maturity and
the risk involved with the technology. As Offshore wind is more risky that Onshore
and PV-large systems, the DSCR is 1.7% for Offshore Wind in Germany and it is 1.3%
for Onshore Wind and PV-large in Germany.
The financial measurements will also be strongly affected in respond to the change
in operation of a plant due to the quantity risks implied from the support mechanism.
Using different indicators related to revenues and costs is very useful to reflect the
consequences of operation change, whether in capacity factor changing or operation
and maintenance costs. Changing the capacity factor will affect the plant production
and the project revenues which will be reflected on all the financial indicators. The
operation and maintenance costs will change only in the case of Onshore Wind as a
consequence of changing the plant production (as the O&M costs defined per MWh of
production) and this will affect the running costs during the life time of the project,
which will be reflected on the yearly cash flow and all the financial indicators specially
the cost related ones like the LCOE.
Table 4.6 summarize the financial indicators descriptions and calculation models
which is used in the RESMIP model6.
4.1.6 Comparison & Analysis Results
In terms of evaluating the different scenarios a comparison between the case study eco-
nomic analysis outcomes against the reference case scenario in the model is done in this
stage. The different financial indicators that reflects the selected support mechanism
and RES-E technology implication on both investment and operation are compared
with the financial indicators of the reference case. Although it is a simple evaluation
approach, but as explained before in the section introduction the simple approach in
carried out in this stage as it can provide a similarly approximate level of information
regarding the implication of a changing certain incentive to another on investment and
operation levels.
6 The NPV,LCOE,IRR detailed description can be found in section 3.1.2
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The quantitative assessment of the scenario is used as an input as well, as it helps
to justify the results generated by the model, and to discuss the implication of the
scenario on the plant operation. Using a comparison between the study scenarios and
the reference case, conclusions regarding the assessment of different RES-E support
mechanisms and technologies on the investment and operation can be driven.
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Financial Indicator
References Calculation Model Unit Description
NPV






The Net Present Value is the sum of the present values
of all the cash inflows and outflows linked to investment
at a given discount rate.
IRR






The Internal Rate of Return is the interest rate at which
the cumulative NPV of the project is zero. A project is
considered desirable if the IRR is bigger than investing
in other options of the same risk level.
LCOE










The levelized cost of electricity is the cost per unit of
output, taking into account the time pattern (discount-
ing) of costs as in the NPV. It represents the minimum
price of electricity which is required to make the invest-
ment in the project viable.
DSCR




The Debt Service Coverage Ratio is the annual available
cashflow from the net operating income divided by the
debt service which is the debt repayment annual obliga-
tion.It is calculated for each year of the project lifetime
and the lowest ratio is reported as the DSCR of the
project.
Table 4.6: RESMIP model financial indicators (NPV, IRR, LCOE, DSCR) calculation models and description summary
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4.2 Scenarios Investigation Using RESMIP Model
The previous section gave a detailed and transparent description for the RESMIP
Model structure. The following section will describe the analysis of the scenarios that
have been selected to be included in the scope of the study. In each scenario the model
inputs will be described, in addition to any relevant assumptions regarding technology
or policy sides. The outcome of each analysis stage will be highlighted in the following
section leaving the final results to be discussed in another chapter.
Figure 4.2 illustrate the scenarios that have been considered in the scope of the study































Figure 4.2: Adapted scenarios framework parameters in the study scope
The scenario is characterized by selecting one of the Two RES-E and One of the
Eight RES-E support mechanisms. This result in sixteen different scenario Frame-
works to be used as an input for the model. In each model run only one scenario is
investigated. Two case studies have been used from the RETScreen database which
have been implemented in Germany. One case study is for Wind Onshore plant and
the other is for building integrated PV 7. Adaptation for the case studies project data
have been made in order to update them to the current market situation.
For each scenario the outcome of the quantitative analysis is fed into RETScreen for
running the case studies. The IRR and DSCR is calculated by RETScreen and used
for the comparison with the reference scenario. The annual cash flow of the project
is extracted from RETScreen and used in a developed discounted cash flow model to
7 More details regarding the case study will be illustrated in section 4.2.3
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calculate The NPV and LCOE 8. The results of NPV and LCOE calculations are then
compared with the RETScreen calculated values for verification.
The reference scenario is the regulated feed-in tariff for both Onshore Wind and
PV as mentioned before in the model general assumption in section 4.1.
4.2.1 Support Mechanisms Scenarios Assessment
For each of the eight scenarios of the support mechanisms different assumptions have
been made upon which the mechanism is evaluated. As outlined in section 3.3 some
of the mechanisms already exist in the German electricity market as the regulatory
defined FIT and MPexpost. So the relevant assumption is driven based on the existing
mechanism design and the evaluation is done based on the empirical effects of the
mechanism on the market actors . The otter support mechanisms are future scenarios,
assumptions that have been made based on the possible proposed scenario for how
possibly the mechanism will look like under the regulated and auctioning schemes.
These assumptions are stated clearly in each support mechanism scenario description.
It is important to note that for the proposed future scenarios, changing the assumptions
related to the mechanism design will result in major changes in the evaluation outcomes.
Regulated Support Mechanisms
1- Scenarios Assumptions
Regulated FIT (reference SM scenario) The remuneration level which is paid per
unit production (e/MWh) is predefined before the project is developed by the elec-
tricity market regulator. The remuneration amount defined is guaranteed for a fixed
project lifetime which varies from RES-E technology to another [BPAZB12].
Regulated MPexpost As explained before in section 3.3.2, under the regulated mar-
ket premium ex-post mechanism. The difference between a regulatory defined tech-
nology specific feed-in tariff (e/MWh), and the actual monthly average technology
specific market value, is covered by a premium payment plus a management premium .
Operators are free to select between the regulated FIT or receiving a Market Premium.
It is also possible to participate in the market through direct marketing scheme, by
marking the electricity production directly into the market and receive the define re-
muneration plus the management premium over the direct marking selling price which
can be lower or higher than the monthly average market price.[GP13a]
Regulated MPexante The difference between the scenario adapted for the MPexante
and the MPexpost scenario is in how the remuneration is defined. In the MPexante the
regulator forecasts the monthly average technology specific market value, and defines
the amount of remuneration before the actual selling process take place in the elec-
tricity market. Depending on how the regulator will structure the mechanism, it can
be defined before the beginning of each month, or the monthly remuneration can be
announced for the next quarter or year. The scenario assumption is that it is defined
8 The calculation of NPV and LCOE is done based on the calculation models defined in chapter 3
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before the beginning of each month. Direct marketing of production is possible as well.
The generator will receive in this case the predefined remuneration on top of his selling
price in the market which can be lower or higher than the forecast average monthly
prices.
Regulated CP The regulator define the amount of remuneration which is given for
the available generation capacity. For non-dispatchable RES-E technologies like Wind
and PV the remuneration is not based on the installed capacity, but on the capacity
factor of the plant [REN13]. The selling price of the produced electricity is defined
according to the market value.
2- Assessment Outcome
The qualitative assessment results for the regulated support mechanisms scenarios are
shown in table 4.7. The assessment is done according to the methodology described in
the support mechanism assessment in section 4.1.3.
FeedIn-Tariff
The FIT mechanism guarantee the remuneration over the life time of the project. That
is why it does not expose the investor to market price risks, as it isolate the revenues
from the electricity market prices. Duo to the long-term guaranteed contracts, there is
no risk possibility because of the change of regulation, which can have a major effect
on the investment security. The FIT helps the policy makers to create an incentive for
investing in an energy generation mixture that includes different RES-E technologies.
This is important for the future of the RES-E as it is never clear which technology or
technological mix will provide an efficient and reliable future, in addition to moving
technologies beyond R&D phase to maturity instead of just focusing the investment
on the mature RES-E technologies.
On the other hand, The determination of the sufficient remuneration is extremely
challenging and it is a burden on the regulator side. The regulator has to avoid over
or under compensation for one technology over another, that will have an influence on
the selection of investment in the most profitable type of RES-E technologies. Plant
operators under the FIT have the advantage of guaranteed dispatchability of electricity
produced combined with the isolation from the market prices. This advantage result in
a ”Produce and Forget” behaviour from the operation side due to reducing the inventive
for operators to react to market signal. Providing the generators with guaranteed
remuneration will not come out with no cost, the additional cost in the FIT mechanism
due to balancing costs, or long term risk compensation costs is burden by the end
consumer.[BPAZB12]
From these advantages and disadvantages of the FIT we can extract the price and
quantity risk factors that can affect investment and operation. Due to the guaranteed
remuneration and the isolation from market prices there is no probability for price
risks. Moreover, due to the guaranteed dispatchability of the electricity production




The German MPexpost aims to increase the integration of the RES on the market and
system levels. It support the market integration in a narrow sense by increasing the
exposure of to the market participants to market prices.Such integration aims to provide
the RES-E operators with experience about the price risks which can be a step toward
fully integrating RES-E into the electricity market in the future. MPexpost create an
incentive for plant operators to curtail production once high negative prices (which is
higher than the remuneration amount) is indicated due to excess supply of electricity.
This will contribute to improve the system integration of RES-E and encourage demand
oriented production in a narrow sense. Direct marketing of production has a benefit of
transferring the forecasting errors costs from the TSO side to the operation side. Not
as in the FIT in the MPexpost the additional costs due to risks is transferred to the
consume only if they become a reality as the remuneration is determined on ex-post
basis.
MPexpost encourage only voluntary curtailment of production. Making profit is
guaranteed due to the management premium even if there is negative prices, only in
case the premium is exhausted by high negative prices the plant operator is encour-
aged to curtail the production as no profit can be made in that case. As the amount
of remuneration is not predefined and guaranteed as in the case in the FIT the MP-
expost, this result in higher uncertainty in the future cash flow of the project. There
is a possibility of creating windfall profits, in case the direct marketing value is higher
than the market value adding the premium on it will result is unexpected profits.
Time of generation for non-dispatchable RES-E technologies like Wind and PV can
hardly be influenced during operation, therefore it has less chances to be more demand
oriented.[BPAZB12, GP13a, EEG10]
Price risks exist under the MPexpost. Due to linking profits to the market monthly
average prices, in addition to the uncertainty in the future cash flows and transferring
the balancing costs due to forecasting errors to the operation side.Regarding quantity
risks, it also take place due to the probability of production curtailing. The probability
of facing these different risks is low in the MPexpost as the negative prices hours
represent a small percentage of the total year hours in the years 2011 and 2012 as show
in Figure 2.4. The impact is based on the sensitivity analysis results in chapter 3.
Market premium ex-ante
According to the assumptions, the regulator pre-define the remuneration which gives
the investor and operator a more clear view than in the MPexpost on what to expect
from selling his electricity production. MPexante supports reaching a complete market
integration for the RES-E through encouraging investors and operators on making
long-term forecasting for the market proceeds and risks, as the remuneration amount
is not determined on monthly average ex-post basis. According to this manner, the
MPexpost create an incentive for increasing the quality of market procedures and
demand forecasting. As in case a high quality forecast is available in combination with
the foreknowledge of the remuneration amount, profits predictability can be done with
higher level of certainty.
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RES-E Support mechanism Pros Cons





level    
(L-M-H)
1- Guaranteed remuneration with no exposure to prices risks 1- The determination of the right remuneration is extremely challenging
2- Long-term FIT don't expose RES-E to the risks of regulatory change 2- Reduce the incentive for RES-E generators to appropriately react to market signals
3- Provide support for RES-E technologies moved beyond R&D phase but didn't reach 
market maturity
3- The mechanism is embodied in a electricity decrees or act by the regulator and this 
require allocation of incurred additional costs to the consumer or taxpayer via the EEG levy . 
4- long term market risk prices is burden by the end consumer. Quantity risk 2- No risk as renewable electricity dispatch is guaranteed
1- Support the market integration of RES-E in a narrow sense, and providing RES-E 
generators with experience about the prices risks.
1- Encourage only voluntarily curtailment of production, as remuneration is guaranteed and 
profits can be made until there is high negative prices of electricity and the premium 
amount is exhausted. 
1- Uncertainty in profit amount as it is linked to 
market average price under the direct 
marketing scheme
2 2 L
2- Improve economic efficiency more than the Feed-in-system by setting incentives 
for shifting maintenance and other unavoidable output reductions to hours with low or 
negative prices.
2- Higher uncertainty in the future cash flow than the FIT. 2- Uncertainty of Future cash flows of the project 1 3 L
3- Insufficient incentive for more comprehensive investment in flexible plant design and 
storage systems. 3- Balancing costs due to forecasting errors 1 2 L
3-Create an Incentive for plant operators for curtailing  production once negative 
prices indicated an excess supply of electricity( above a certain level of negative 
prices which is higher than the remuneration amount).
4- Contribute to improve the system integration of RES-E through encouraging demand 
oriented production and maintaining grid stability.
4- MP has not been able to break the increasing number of congestion management 
measures Transmission system operators have to take to safeguard grid stability.
5-Direct marketing of production transfers the forecasting errors balancing costs from 
the Transmission system operators to the plant operators. 5- long term market risk prices in case it become reality is burden by the end consumer.
6- Create an incetive for making an extra investing to make the plant remotly 
controled, through defining special remuenration for the remote controlled plants. 6- Allows higher possibility of windfall profits than in the FIT.
7-price risks is transferred to end consumer via the EEG levy only if they become 
reality, as remuneration is determined on ex-post basis based on the monthly average 
market prices. 
7- Wind and PV operators can hardly influence the time of generation, therefore have less 
chances of demand oriented feeding of electricity.
1- The Predefined remuneration level increases the predictability of the tariffs amount, 
rather than in the Mpexpost case .
1- Forecasting the market prices to define the fixed premium is challenging for RES-E as it 
require knowledge of the feed-in behaviour of the generation capacities. In addition to the 
uncertainties in case of new market design that impair the calculation of an ex-ante 
premium. 
1- Long -term price risk for investors. 2 3 M
2- Support a complete market integration for RES-E through encouraging investors and 
operators on long-term forecasting of the market proceeds and the entire market 
price risks, as the remuneration is fixed in addition to the market revenues and not 
determined on ex-post basis. 
2- Investors and plant operators have to bear the long-term revenue risk for the volume of 
electricity produced without needed demand.
2- Risk of low remuneration level due to 
forecasting errors of the fixed premium amount. 2 4 M
3- Create an incentive for increasing the quality of market proceeds and demand 
forecasting, as profits will highly depend on it. 
3-  Possibility of windfall profits generation in case market prices exceed expectation. In that 
case the premium which have been determined would create risk for end customer prices. 
3- Uncertainty of Future cash flows due to the 
long-term revenue risk. 1 3 L
4-If a special remuneration is taking into account, the MPexante can create the same 
incentive for making the plant remotly controlled as in the Mpexpost.
4- Does not produce any efficiency gains rather than a variable premium on the short term, 
as the operators will feed-in electricity even at negative market prices until the premium 
amount is exhausted and there is no profit.
5- In case a high quality forecast of the market prices is done, combined with the 
foreknowledge of the remuneration level. Profits prediction can be done with high 
level of certainty.
5-The expected value for the end customer is higher as price risks is transferred to end 
consumer always as remuneration is determined on fixed ex-ante basis. 
1- Potentially increased investment in generation capacity, in order to increase the 
reliability of supply. Specially if regulator addressed the availability and cost of long-
term financing for capacity expansion and  secured short-term contracts.
1- Uncertainty about capacity value of variable RES-E implies that it might not be as 
beneficial for these generation sources as for conventional units. Price risk 1- Exposure to volatility of electricity prices 4 5 H
2- More revenues can be possibly obtained from the capacity payment in addition to 
electricity selling in the market.
2-In case not structured for different RES-E technologies. It can locks in particular technology 
type. As the capacity factor is key element, technologies with higher capacity factors could 
be favorable for investment.
2- Uncertainty of capacity factors of RES-E 
technologies on the long term 2 3 M
3- Can be structured to compensate all types of
available capacity, including RES-E different technologies with different capacity 
factors.
3- The Potential to contribute positively to the grid stability is reduced , as the capacity 
payment can guarantee generating revenues, even in case of excessive electricity 
production.





























Risk evaluation Qualitative risk assessment
1- No price risks as remuneration is isolated from 
electricity prices
Market Premium ex-ante 
(Mpexante)
3- Production curtailing  risk due to negative 
prices higher than the remuneration on the 




Market Premium  ex-post 
(Mpexpost)
Feed-in Tariff (FIT)




Quantity risk 4- Output curtailing  risk same as in the MP ex-post mechanism. 2 3 M
3
Price risk
Table 4.7: Qualitative assessment of the regulated support mechanisms
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The MPexante disadvantages are mainly because of the need of market procedures
and forecasting risks from the regulator side in order to define the technology specific
remuneration, and from the investment side to be able to predict the profits and esti-
mate the investment feasibility. The forecasting is extremely challenging for the RES-E
as it requires knowledge of the generation capacities feed-in behaviour, in addition to
demand forecasting which will be a burden on the regulatory and operation sides.
Moreover, there is a risk on investors involved with generating long-term revenues, in
case of excessive electricity production which can not generate any profit. On the other
hand, there is a possibility of windfall profits generation in case market prices exceed
expectations which is an advantage from the investment side, but a disadvantage from
the customer side as it can create a risk on the prices and at the end the customer
will have to burden higher prices. It can also be argued that the MPexante dose not
produce any efficiency gains rather than a variable MPexpost on the short term. Op-
erators will continue feeding electricity even in case of negative prices until the same
condition of the MPexpost is applied and the premium amount is exhausted which
means that there is no profit gained from selling electricity.[bde13, EEG10]
The risks which the MPexante implie on investment are due to the amount of uncer-
tainty involved with the mechanism. There is long-term price risk on the investment
due to the market prices forecasting errors . In addition to the risk on low remuner-
ation level due to wrong forecasting or underestimation from the regulator side. The
certainty in the future cash-flows is not high due to the revenues risks. On the quantity
risk side the production curtailing due to exhausted premium from the high negative
prices exists as in the MPexpost mechanism.
The probability of the the long-term price risk depends on the quality of the market
prices forecast, and the impact is not high due to the existence of the premium which
can cover a part of the negative prices. Assuming that the regulator forecast is done
with high quality the probability of defining low level of remuneration is not high.
However, in case that the remuneration is not sufficient, the impact on the investment
can be high and the profitability of operating the plant can be questionable. For the
quantity risks the probability and impact of curtailing the production is based on the
same assessment criteria in the MPexpost.
Capacity payment
Capacity payment create an incentive for increasing investment in generation capacity.
This is one of the solution for securing the supply and increase the reliability of the
system. In case the regulator announce a defined long-term plan addressing the avail-
ability and cost of financing for capacity extension, in addition to secured short-term
contracts for the lifetime of the plant this will represent a source of security for RES-
E investment. CP represents a source of revenues in addition to electricity selling in
the market, besides it can be structured to compensate all types of available capacity
including non-dispatchable RES-E technologies. An empirical advantage of the CP
mechanisms in the Irish market [REN13] is that it reduced the volatility of wholesale
energy prices.
As defined in the assumptions related to the CP mechanism, non-dispatchable RES-
58
E technologies remuneration is based on the capacity value of the plat not the installed
capacity. There is an amount of uncertainty regarding the capacity value specially
that the resource can not be controlled by operators. Such uncertainty can put the
dispatchable RES-E and conventional technologies in a favourable position for invest-
ment. This favourable position increases in case the structure of the mechanism is not
compensating all types of available capacity, resulting in locking particulate technology
types. The payment for the available capacity can guarantee generation revenues even
in case of feeding in during the availability of excessive electricity. This can result in
reducing the positive contribution toward the grid stability through demand oriented
generation behaviour. Although that there are empirical advantages in the Irish elec-
tricity market regarding reducing the volatility of the wholesale electricity prices, an
empirical disadvantage is the high prices.[REN13, Ore00]
Exposure to the market electricity price volatility is a major disadvantage of the
CP, as the remuneration is not based on compensating the production price, but on
the available capacity. For the non-dispatchable RES-E as the resource can not be
controlled and the short experience regarding these technologies, the capacity factor
has an amount of uncertainty which represents a risk for investment. Curtailing the
production is possible due to exhausted remuneration by the high negative prices, this
situation is most likely to take place if the capacity required to be installed is over
estimated by the regulator.
The exposure to the market prices probability is high under the CP as generators have
to directly sell there electricity production. The exposure to market prices volitionality
has represent a very high price risk factor on investment. The uncertainty in the
available capacity can be adapted from the operation side by coordination the operation
and maintenance schedules in a way that do not effect the production ( for example in
low wind seasons), however a low amount of uncertainty still exists due to the resource
and unplanned conditions. The impact of such uncertainty can be evaluated as a
medium risk level as it is directly related to the remuneration received for the plant. The
Quantity risk under the CP assuming good planning of the needed installed capacity
can have low to medium probability, in case the capacity is covering the demand
and some additional capacity is available for supply security. In that condition the
probability of negative prices can be not high. In case this risk exist it can have a
medium impact like the uncertainty due to the capacity availability, resulting on a




Auctioned FIT Under this scenario the same assumption under the regulated FIT is
adapted. But the difference is that the remuneration amount is defined based on an
auction process done by the regulator. The auction is done during the project feasibility
stage (as shown before in figure 3.1) to define the required technology specific long-term
remuneration to be paid per unit production (e/MWh). The project developers submit
the bids and the lowest required remuneration level is adapted by the regulator for the
other projects. In that case the project developers and investors can take the decision
to proceed with the project commission or not based on the remuneration defined
details. Redefining the remuneration amount can be done by making new auctions
based on the regulator plans. Accordingly, the new remuneration will be adapted for
the new installed capacities. As for the old projects the defined remuneration is not
modified for the project lifetime, and in the regulated FIT the dispatchability of RES-E
production is guaranteed.
Auctioned MPexpost Instead of the amount of remuneration defined based on the
difference between a regulated FIT and the average monthly prices of electricity, the
amount of remuneration required will be based on a monthly auction. RES-E gener-
ation plant submit there bids for the required technology specific amount of remuner-
ation to be paid on top of the average monthly market prices. The lower bids will be
adapted as a technology specific remuneration, and be paid for the generation plants.
There is also a possibility of working under the direct marketing scheme.
The economic efficiency related to the costs and efforts of a monthly auctioning
process can be questionable. However, a monthly auction assumption is based on the
current design of the MPexpost in Germany as the remuneration is defined on monthly
bases based on the average electricity monthly prices.
From risk perspective a monthly or yearly auction impact on the risk can be on
reducing the uncertainty involved with the risk, but not to remove or mitigate the risk.
The risk will still exist in both cases.
Auctioned MPexante An auction takes place in the project feasibility stage (as
shown before in figure 3.1) as it is done in the auctioned FIT for the amount of re-
muneration required for the lifetime of the project on technology specific bases. The
remuneration paid under the MPexante mechanism is defined as the difference between
the foretasted monthly average market value price (by te regulator), and the auctioned
required technology specific remuneration. The regulator adapts the lowest bids for
each technology, according to the level of calculating the remuneration based on.
The auction of the required remuneration can take place before the beginning of each
month, quarter or year based on the regulator plan. The assumption adapted here is
that the auction done before the beginning of each month.
As mentioned before in the MPexpost a yearly or monthly auction will not result on
removing a risk factor, it can have an influence in reducing the amount of uncertainty
but the risk will exist in both cases.
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Auctioned CP Instead of defining the remuneration which is given for the available
generation capacity by the regulator, the desired remuneration is defined on auction
bases. The regulator defines the amount of capacity needed to be available for each
RES-E technology, and make an auction among investors and project developers for
the desired remuneration for the lifetime of the project. The lowest bids for each
technology is allowed to proceed with the project plans and capacity installation until
the technology specific capacity target is fulfilled. It is assumed that the regulator have
a long-term defined installing capacity plan, and the auctioning process take place each
time installing new capacities needed based on the plan.
2- Auctioning (tendering) Advantages and Disadvantages
Auction scheme has advantages and disadvantages when compared to the regulated
scheme. First it is important to highlight these advantages and disadvantages as it will
have an influence on the support mechanisms risk assessment results.
The advantages of auctioning are enabling higher degree of subsidy efficiency to be
obtained rather than in the regulated scheme, as the remuneration level is not defined
by the regulator, but by bids from investors in a competitive environment. Defining
the remuneration level through bids has another advantage on the regulator side as
it removes the burden of defining the right amount of remuneration level for each
technology. Leaving the market to define the desired amount of remuneration needed
in a competitive environment, reduces the risk of over compensation due to a high
defined remuneration by the regulator . In addition, if the remuneration is guaranteed
and secured with long-term, this will result on reducing the uncertainty related to
investment under the auctioning scheme as in the regulated scheme.
On the other hand, auction can result in underestimating the remuneration level and
failure of finalizing the RES-E project development, like what happened in the UK be-
tween the year 1990 and 2000 under the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO) [BN08]. As
investors have to estimate the needed remuneration level in a competitive environment,
they will have to depend on mature RES-E technologies. Such behaviour can have an
influence on the renewable energy generation mixture. Moreover it will not have an
incentive for investors to invest in technologies beyond R&D which didn’t not reach
the market maturity, which can influence the development curve of these technologies.
It is kind of unexpected that a successful auction or tender procedure might be a dis-
advantage, however this successful procedure might result in many project initiatives
being prepared in vain as the case of Canada/Quebec (October 2005) in the second call
for tender for 2000 MW onshore wind energy, which was overbooked by almost a fac-
tor of 4[Eco08a]. Probability of having negative prices still exist under the auctioning
scheme. Assuming that under a perfect competition bids for selling and buying will
match, and this will reduce the probability of having negative prices. But the perfect
competition market case can hardly take place practically. Another disadvantage is
that as generators do not know the auction process in advance, there is a higher uncer-
tainty in the future cashflow more than in the regulated mechanisms.[REN13, Bey12].
Table 4.8 summarize the advantages and disadvantages of auctioning (tendering).
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Advantages 1-Enables high degree of subsidy efficiency to be obtained as remunera-
tion level is not defined by the regulator, but by bids from investors in a
competitive environment.
2-Remove the burden from the regulator to define the right remuneration
level for each RES-E technology.
3- Investment uncertainty can be reduced as in the regulated scheme, if
the remuneration is guaranteed and combined with long-term contracts.
4- Reduce the risk of over compensation due to high level of remuneration
defined by the regulator.
Disadvantages 1- Risk of underestimating the remuneration level and failure of finalizing
the RES-E project development.
2- In order to determine the remuneration level investors will need to
depend on mature RES-E technologies, which can affect the generation
mixture required from renewables.
3- Can have an effect on the development of RES-E technologies which
is beyond R&D but didn’t reach the market maturity.
4-Successful tender procedure might result in many project initiatives
being prepared in vain.
5-Due to the higher uncertainty in the remuneration sufficiency (than in
the regulated case) for the project development due to low bid estimation,
auctioning can favour large projects more than small projects.
6- Probability of negative prices still exist. However under perfect com-
pletion market status, the probability of electricity negative prices will
be lower than the regulatory defined mechanisms, as bids for selling and
buying will be matched.
7- Implies higher uncertainty in the future cashflow than the regulated
mechanisms, as generators do not know in advance the resulting dispatch
from the auctioning process.
Table 4.8: Auctioning (tendering)advantages and disadvantages
3- Assessment Outcome
The pros and cons of the support mechanisms will be affected with the advantage
and disadvantages of the auctioning scheme. This will result in a different price and
quantity risk evaluations from the ones that have been done under the regulated scheme
in section 4.2.1, and even can result in introducing new risk factors for some support
mechanisms.
The qualitative assessment results for the auctioned support mechanisms scenarios
are shown in table 4.9. The assessment is done according to the methodology described







Risk level  
(L-M-H)
1‐High uncertainty in the future cash flow due to variable remuneration based on auctioning process 3 3 M
2‐Risk due to uncertainty of remuneration sufficiency specially that the auction resulting is unknown 3 5 H
3‐In case of direct marketing there is a risk due to premium amount sufficiency uncertainty ,as it is linked to average market prices . 2 3 M
4‐ Output curating risk  (compared to the FIT) due to auctioning dispatch resulting 1 3 L
5‐ Output curating risk due to higher negative prices than premium level 1 3 L
1‐ Long‐term prices risk on investors due to forecasting errors. 2 3 M
2‐ Risk of low remuneration level due to low bids or forecasting errors. 3 4 H
3‐ Uncertainty of the future cash flow as premium is paid on the top of market prices. 1 3 L
4‐ Dispatchability risk due to uncertainty in the auctioning results 1 3 L
5‐ Output curating risk due to higher negative prices than premium level 1 3 L
1‐ Exposure to volatility of electricity prices 4 5 H
2‐ Uncertainty of remuneration sufficiency due to low bids estimation  2 4 H
3‐  Uncertainty of the future cash flow as revenues is based on the market prices 2 3 M
4‐ Uncertainty of capacity factors of RES‐E technologies on the long term 2 3 M
5‐ Production curtailing risk due to negative prices higher than the remuneration on the capacity and no profit is generated 1 3 L






























Market Premium  ex-post (Mpexpost)
Market Premium ex-ante (Mpexante)
Capacity payment (CP)








Table 4.9: Qualitative assessment of the auctioned support mechanisms
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FeedIn-Tariff
There is a possibility that some bids are estimated lower than the real required re-
muneration. This can be the case due to the bids submitted on competitive bases,
or as for the immature RES-E technologies as there is no enough experience with the
project development costs, and the risk associated with it is high. This possibility
represents uncertainty for investment and a price risk factor. On the other side, as the
dispatchability of the RES-E is guaranteed there is no quantity risks.
The possibility of under estimating the remuneration needed is very low. As it is as-
sumed that the auctioning process will result in the needed remuneration level for each
RES-E technologies, and the auction will be applied on the market technologies which
is already implemented and there is a basic amount of experience gained regarding it
like Wind Onshore and PV. However, in case it exist, it can have a medium impact on
continuing the project development.
Market premium ex-post
The remuneration level varies depending on two factors, the market average prices
and the auction result for the desired remuneration. This results in uncertainty of the
sufficiency of the remuneration level for generating profits and securing the investment,
in addition to uncertainty in the future cashflow as the remuneration level is variable.
In the direct marketing case there is also uncertainty of how much premium will be
paid on top of the selling price, and if it is enough or not for generating revenues.
Regarding the quantity risks, there is an output curtailing risk due to two reasons.
First in comparison with the regulated FIT there is a possibility that production will
not be dispatched as the operator expects that the auction will result in lower amount
of remuneration than what he desires on top of the market price. Second even if the
expected amount of remuneration is sufficient for operators, there is a possibility that
a high negative electricity prices exhaust the remuneration and the production feeding
and in that case it is not profitable any more.
The probability of the uncertainty in the remuneration level sufficiency and future
cash flow is medium as there is more than one reason behind it. However the impact
of having insufficient remuneration is very high on the investment, as electricity in
that case is already sold in a certain price which is not compensated. In the direct
marketing case the probability of having insufficient premium amount which will risk
the revenues is lower than in the premium with average monthly prices case, taking
into consideration that there is a probability of having higher than the average market
prices under the direct marketing. For the quantity risks the probability of curtailing
is very low assuming that the supply and demand will match in the auctioning process,
but the impact on the operation and project revenues can be medium.
Market premium ex-ante
There is a long-term price risk because of the market prices forecasting errors in both
the regulated and auctioned MPexpost. In addition, there is a risk of low received
remuneration level due to two reasons, forecasting errors or low bids in the auctioning
process. These price risks will result in uncertainty in the future cash flows of the
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project, which can affect the investment security. The dispatchability of production
is not guaranteed as the auction results can be lower than the expected remuneration
and selling the production is not profitable in that case. Negative prices possibility
exists as well and it can be a quantity risk factor.
Price risk due to the low remuneration level can have a medium probability as the
demand forecasting is challenging and can involve uncertainty in the forecast results .
In case this happens it can have a high impact on the project revenues and feasibility.
Regarding the quantity risks the same probabilities as in the auctioned MPexpost exist
under the MPexante.
Capacity Payment
The difference in the auctioned CP from the regulated CP on the price risks is mainly
in introducing two new risk factors; the uncertainty of the remuneration sufficiency
due to low bids estimations,and the uncertainty in the future cash flow and revenue
generation. These two price risks are introduced because of the uncertainties associated
with the auction in process and due to the exposure of the operators to market price
volatility.
The probability of having insufficient remuneration due to bids under estimation is
low, assuming that the investors use the existing experience in the Wind Onshore and
PV to estimate the needed remuneration level. On the other hand, the impact of this
risk factor on continuing the project development and economic feasibility can be high.
Another change from the regulated MPexpost is on the probability of curtailing due to
negative prices, it can be assumed that the regulator will define the needed capacity
and this will reduce the probability of having negative prices in the market to be very
low.
Overview on the Scenarios Risk Profiles
Figure 4.3 gives an overview summary on the previously described risk factors under
the regulated and auctioned SM different scenarios. Distribution of the risk factors for
each scenario is represented in the risk matrix. The distribution of risk factors is done
based on the probability and impact of each risk factor as explained before in section
4.2.1 and section 4.2.1.
Support mechanism risk premium Estimation
The risk premium (asm) (which is used in the next analysis stage) is estimated based
on the price and quantity risk factors levels as shown in the risk profiles of each support
mechanism scenario 4.3. An overall support mechanism risk level is defined using two
parameters: The number of risk factor associated with the support mechanism, and the
average of probability and impact of all the risk factors resulted from the quantitative
scenario analysis as shown before for the regulated mechanisms in table 4.7, and for
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Figure 4.3: Risk profiles of the regulated and auctioned mechanisms using a risk matrix
representation
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Table 4.10 shows the assumed values for each risk level. These values are assumed
based on the proposed support mechanisms risk premiums values in technical report
by [GX04]. However, not the same support mechanisms are discussed in this report.
Risk Level No-Risk (Reference Scenario) Low Medium High
(asm) assumed 1 1.2 1.6 2.5
Table 4.10: Assumed range of asm for the different scenarios risk levels
The different support mechanisms risk premium (asm) assumptions for the various
scenarios are shown in table 4.11. For the reference scenario as there are no price or
quantity risk factors, the assumed (asm) value is 1. In the MPexpost (Reg) scenario
the overall risk level assessment is from low to medium. The (asm) value assumed is
1.3 as most of the risk factors have low level. For the MPexante (Reg) scenario the
overall risk level is medium. The assumed (asm) value is 1.6, which is at the beginning
of the medium range as one of the risk factors has low level. Regarding the CP (Reg)
the overall risk level is from medium to high. The assumed (asm) value is 2.0, which
between the medium and high ranges defined before in table 4.10.
Scheme Support mechanism Risk Level Range (asm)
FIT (Reference Scenario) No price or quantity risk 1
Regulated MPexpost Low to Medium 1.3
MPexante Medium 1.6
CP Medium to High 2.0
FIT Low 1.2
Auctioned MPexpost Medium 1.8
MPexante Medium to High 2.1
CP High 2.5
Table 4.11: Assumed support mechanism risk premium (asm) for different scenarios
For the auctioned support mechanisms. The FIT(Auc) scenario has a low overall
risk level. The assumed (asm) value is 1.2, which is at the beginning of the low range
defined before. For the MPexpost(Auc) scenario the overall risk level is medium. The
assumed (asm) value is 1.8, which is higher than the beginning of the medium rang as
there is one risk factor with high level. The MPexante (Auc) scenario has Medium to
high overall risk level. The assumed (asm) value is 2.1, which in almost in the middle
of the medium to high range defined before. For the CP (Auc) scenario the overall risk
level is high. The assumed (asm) value is 2.5, which is the highest level defined in the
range as shown in table 4.10.
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4.2.2 Quantitative Assessment of RES-E Technologies and
Support Mechanisms Scenarios
As described in section 4.1.4, based on the results of the support mechanisms scenarios
assessment the investment financial requirement (re, rd, ge, gd, β) will be defined. In
addition, the policy risk premium aSM will be evaluated based on the risk profile of
the support mechanism in comparison to the reference SM scenario. Consequently the
calculated value of the WACC will change under each scenario. On the operation side
changes in the capacity factor and O&M costs are based on the quantity risks under
each support mechanism scenario.
As shown before in Figure 4.2, there are two main RES-E technologies included in
the study scenarios. For each technology, the investment WACC and the operation
capacity factor is calculated to be used as an input for the case studies in the economic
analysis stage.
Investment WACC Calculations for Wind Onshore and PV
WACC parameter assumption Price risk factors
Requiring a higher (re) & (rd)
• Uncertainty in profit generation as remunera-
tion is linked to market prices.
• Long-term price risks due to forecasting errors
costs.
• Uncertainty in the sufficiency of the remunera-
tion level for securing the investment revenues
or for developing the project.
• Exposure to the volatility of electricity prices.
• Uncertainty in profit generation as remunera-
tion is linked to market prices.
Requiring a higher (DSCR) • Uncertainty in the future cashflow.
Limiting the debt share (gd)
and requiring a higher equity
share (ge)
• Depending on the risk levels of the price risk
factors.
Table 4.12: WACC calculation parameters assumption criteria based on the SM sce-
narios assessment .
The WACC based on the calculation model described in equation 4.6. The assump-
tions made for the changes in the parameters which define the WACC is related to the
68
price risks in each SM scenario assessment. Table 4.12 show the assumptions adapted
for defining the WACC calculation parameters. After identifying which factors have
to be changed in each scenario, the numerical value of each parameter assumption is
based on the risk levels of the price risk factors.
Wind Onshore and PV reference scenario WACC For the reference scenario (reg-
ulated FIT), the WACC estimation is done based on the values currently used in the
German RES-E market shown in table 4.13 .
Variable Share debt/equity
Risk free 
rate Risk Premium 
Expected 

















Appreviation g (%) Rf  (%) Rp (%) Rm  (%) β re (%) rd (%) rt (%) WACC (%)
Reference
German market 
risk free & 
premium
IESE Business School Pablo 
Fernandez  mrp (2013) 1.90 5.50 7.40
Schwabe et al.(2011)* 6.30
BMU (2011)* 75.00 1.90 5.50 7.40 1.84 12.00 5 to 5.5 0.00 5.1 to 5.4
Deutshe Winguard (2010)* 5.80
DRL et al.(2012)* 6.00
Frauenhofer ISE (2012) 70.00 1.90 5.50 7.40 1.29 9.00 4.50 0.00 5.90
Frauenhofer ISE (2013) 70.00 1.90 5.50 7.40 1.29 9.00 4.50 0.00 5.90
Deutshe Winguard (2012) 75.00 1.90 5.50 7.40 1.84 12.00 5.50 0.00 6.5 to 7
Frauenhofer ISE (2013) 80.00 1.90 5.50 7.40 0.75 6.00 4.00 0.00 4.40
Frauenhofer ISE (2012) 80.00 1.90 5.50 7.40 0.75 6.00 4.00 0.00 4.40
Frauenhofer ISE (2013) 80.00 1.90 5.50 7.40 0.75 8.00 4.00 0.00 4.80







Table 4.13: WACC for different RES-E in Germany
Note: *See [FEL13].
Based on various references, the WACC assumptions and values are shown in the
table above. As seen above from the different color codes there are assumed values
and calculated values. The risk free rate (Rf ), risk premium (Rp) are used as assumed
values for the different RES-E technologies based on the table 4.3. The expected mar-
ket rate of retun is the sum of the risk free rate and risk premium. One of the main
objectives of these calculation is estimating β which can be calculated using the know
variables from equation 4.2.
The calculation of the WACC for the Wind and PV under different scenarios is shown
in table 4.14 . The reference case parameters are estimated using the values in table
4.13, and the different scenario values is estimated based on the support mechanisms
assessment results and the criteria is defined in table 4.12.
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Variable Appreviation Debt (d) Equity (e)
Debt 
(d)



















Share debt/equity g (%) 70.00 30.00 70.00 30.00 65.00 35.00 60.00 40.00 70.00 30.00 65.00 35.00 65.00 35.00 60.00 40.00
Risk free rate Rf (%) 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90
Risk Premium Rp = Rm-Rf (%) 3.30 5.50 3.30 5.50 3.30 5.50 3.30 5.50 3.30 5.50 3.30 5.50 3.30 5.50 3.30 5.50
Expected market rate of return Rm (%) 5.20 7.40 5.20 7.40 5.20 7.40 5.20 7.40 5.20 7.40 5.20 7.40 5.20 7.40 5.20 7.40
Support mechanism risk premium asm 1.3 1.6 2.0 1.2 1.8 2.1 2.5
Equity beta β 1.0 1.3 1.6 2.0 1.2 1.8 2.1 2.5
Equity rate of return re (%) 7.4 9.0 10.7 12.9 8.5 11.8 13.5 15.7
Debt rate of return rd (%) 5.20 5.20 6.20 9.00 5.20 5.70 6.20 9.00
Tax rate (Corporation tax) rt (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Weighted average cost of capital WACC (%)
Variable Appreviation Debt (d) Equity (e)
Debt 
(d)



















Share debt/equity g (%) 80.00 20.00 80.00 20.00 75.00 25.00 70.00 30.00 80.00 20.00 75.00 25.00 75.00 25.00 70.00 30.00
Risk free rate Rf (%) 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90
Risk Premium Rp = Rm-Rf (%) 2.10 5.50 2.10 5.50 2.10 5.50 2.10 5.50 2.10 5.50 2.10 5.50 2.10 5.50 2.10 5.50
Expected market rate of return Rm (%) 4.00 7.40 4.00 7.40 4.00 7.40 4.00 7.40 4.00 7.40 4.00 7.40 4.00 7.40 4.00 7.40
Support mechanism risk premium asm 1.3 1.6 2.0 1.2 1.8 2.1 2.5
Equity beta β 0.75 0.98 1.20 1.50 0.90 1.35 1.58 1.88
Equity rate of return re (%) 6.0 7.26 8.50 10.15 6.85 9.33 10.56 12.21
Debt rate of return rd (%) 4.00 4.00 5.00 8.00 4.00 4.50 5.00 8.00
Tax rate (Corporation tax) rt (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Weighted average cost of capital WACC (%)
Defination Color code
calculated value
Assumed value                                   
Capacity 
payment
4.4 4.7 5.9 8.6 4.6 5.7 6.4 9.3
Small PV 
















5.9 6.3 7.8 10.6 6.2 7.8 8.7 11.7
Wind Energy














Table 4.14: Wind onshore and small PV WACC calculations under different support mechanisms scenarios
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Operating capacity factor and O&M costs assumptions
Based on the description of the plant operation perspective in section 4.1.4, the ca-
pacity factor of the plant will change based on the quantity risks associated with the
support mechanism adapted scenario. As described in section 4.2.1, there are different
quantity risk factors related to each support mechanism scenario assessment, based on
the risk level of the quantity risks the capacity factor change is estimated. As most it
is common in most of the assessment results that the quantity risk is due to the high
negative prices, the amount of possible negative prices per year is calculated based on
figure 2.4. An assumption have been made in estimating the capacity factor reduc-
tion due to the negative electricity prices, is that the plant operator will curtail the
production at any value of a market negative price, so the capacity factor is reduced
by the same percentage of the total negative price hours per year, which represents
approximately 1% in the year 2012 .
As clarified before in section 4.1.4 there are different approaches to define the O&M
costs for Wind onshore and PV. Table 4.15 give an example of the different O&M costs
approaches and values used for Onshore Wind in Germany.
Type of O&M cost
Reference Schwabe et al. (2011) DRL et al. (2012) Eggersglüß (2012) BMU (2011) Frauenhofer ISE (2012)
O&M Cost 47,700 48,400 25.2 22.1 14.9
Average value
Fixed (€/MW/year) Variable costs(€/MWh) 
48,050 20.7
Table 4.15: O&M costs for Onshore Wind in Germany
References:[FEL13, Fra12]
The used value for Onshore Wind O&M costs in RESMIP is the average value of the
proposed variable costs (20.7 e/MWh). For the PV case study the same O&M costs
provided in the project database is used fixed costs per year 9.
9Modifications on the O&M costs per year have been made, details can be found in section 4.2.3
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4.2.3 Wind and PV Case Studies
The selected plants for assessing the scenarios are the same defined in the sensitivity
analysis at section 3.2. However, modifications from the RETScreen10 original case
study data have been made, according to the RESMIP model assumption and the
previous WACC calculations of both the Onshore wind and PV case studies. These
modification is describe below.
Case Studies Input for the Reference Scenario
Wind Onshore : Regarding the Onshore Wind case study the modifications made
under the reference scenario are displayed in table 4.16.
Project information Value modified to
Electricity Export Cost     
(feed-in tariff)
project lifetime 20 years
Financial assumptions inflation rate 2.50%
discount rate 9% 5.9%
 debt ratio 31% 70.0%
debt interest rate 5.75% 5.2%
debt term 15 years
non-debt portion (equity) 30.0%
Taxes
feasibility study € 45,000
development € 330,000
engineering € 30,000
grid connection € 1,300,000.00
balance of plant € 700,000
 O&M costs definition Fixed cost per year 20.7(€/MWh)
total O&M costs per year € 277,704 € 361,216
capacity factor 20.10%







Not applicable on Wind farm income
Table 4.16: Wind Onshore reference scenario case study input parameters
Note: RETScreen Wind case details can be found in [RET13c]
The project lifetime is changed to 20 years instead of 25 years based on the proposal
in the recent RES-E economic studies 11. The O&M costs changes based on what have
been illustrated before in the previous section. Changes in the discount rate (from 9.0%
to 5.9%), debt ration from (31% to 70%), debt interest rate (from 5.75% to 5.20%)
and equity ration (from 69% to 30%) are based on the WACC calculations for each
scenario as shown in the Wind Onshore case in 4.14.
It is important to note that some of these modifications are valid for all support
mechanisms scenarios, like the project lifetime (20years) and the O&M costs per MWh
(20.7 e/MWh)12.
PV :Regarding the PV case study the modifications made under the reference scenario
are displayed in table 4.17.
10 RETScreen overview is given before in section 3.2
11 For example[Fra12, Fra13]
12 The total O&M costs per year will change from scenario to another depending on the amount of
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Project information RETScreen database Value modified to
Electricity Export Cost (feed-in tariff)
project lifetime 25 years
share of debt 0% 80%
debt term 15 years
debt rate 4.0%
discount rate 8% 4,4%
incentives and Grants 4,138,211 € 0 €
inflation rate 2.00%
PV (polycrystalline)  €5,670/KWp
BIPV (total installation cost) € 860.00
taxes Not applicable on PV income
feasibility study, planning 
and Engineering € 560,000
development € 330,000
engineering € 30,000
inverters cost € 600,000
capacity factor (including 
inverter losses) 9.40%
total Energy production 819.27 MWh/year
O&M costs  defination Fixed over project lifetime Annual increase with 2%
total O&M costs increase 
over lifetime € 0 € 7,344






Table 4.17: PV reference scenario case study input parameters
Note: RETScreen PV case details can be found in [RET13b]
The project lifetime is changed to 30 years instead of 25 years and the O&M costs
assumed to have an increase of 2.0% per year 13. Changes in discount rate (from 8.0%
to 4.4%), share of debt (from 0% to 80%) with adding a debt term of 15 years and debt
interest rate of 4.0%, and equity ration (from 100% to 20%) are based on the WACC
calculations for each scenario as shown in the small PV table 4.14. The incentive grant
is removed as it is not applicable as a part of the capital structure on the current small
PV installations .
It is important to note that some of these modifications are valid for all support
mechanisms scenarios, like the project lifetime (25years), the O&M costs annual in-
crease (2.0% per year), the debt term (15 years) and there will be no grants included
as a part of the capital.
The case studies input details for the different scenarios assessed in the scope of the
study for Onshore wind and PV cases can be found in the appendix (a) .
4.2.4 Economic Analysis Outcomes
In the economic analysis stage, the financial indicator calculations are made according
to what have been illustrated in section 4.1.5 for each case study. The results of these
calculations are presented below, leaving the evaluation and discussion of the results
to the following chapter.
energy production.
13 These modifications are based on the proposed in the recent PV projects studies (e.g.[Fra12, Fra13])
73
Wind Onshore Case Study Analysis Results under different Scenarios
The results of the financial indicator calculations for the wind onshore case study under
different support mechanisms scenarios are presented in table 4.18. The first column
represents the General scheme of the mechanism, as have been explained before the
scope of the study includes the regulated and auctioned schemes. The four investigated
support mechanisms under each scheme are presented in the second column. The
selected financial indicators calculation results in absolute values under each scenario
are shown from column three to six .
General Scheme Support mechanism NPV (M€) IRR  (%)  LCOE (€/MWh) DSCR (%)
FIT (Reference Scenario) 3.8152 18.0% 72.12 1.83%
Mpexpost 2.6975 15.8% 76.3 1.73%
Mpexante 1.7507 13.5% 80.36 1.75%
CP 0.0925 10.9% 90.31 1.69%
FIT 3.6120 18.0% 72.63 1.83%
Mpexpost 1.3471 12.2% 82.35 1.71%
Mpexante 0.8348 11.6% 85.27 1.66%
CP -1.1205 7.5% 100.42 1.47%
Regulated
Auctioned
Table 4.18: Wind Onshore Scenarios Economic analysis Results
PV Case Study Analysis Results under different Scenarios
Table 4.19 presents the financial indicators results for the PV case study under the
support mechanism scenarios included in the scope of the study. The same table
structure adapted as in the Wind Onshore case.
General Scheme Support mechanism NPV (M€) IRR  (%)  LCOE (€/MWh) DSCR (%)
FIT (Reference Scenario) 1.9487 9.80% 344 0.89%
Mpexpost 1.0037 7.50% 390 0.79%
Mpexante 0.1895 6.40% 442 0.79%
CP -1.3107 4.20% 590 0.70%
FIT 1.8337 9.80% 348 0.89%
Mpexpost -0.3224 4.70% 484 0.72%
Mpexante -0.6511 4.30% 516 0.69%
CP -1.9164 2.40% 691 0.61%
Regulated
Auctioned
Table 4.19: PV Scenarios Economic analysis Results
The next chapter will focusses on explaining these results into details, and the con-
sequences of each scenario on investment and operation.
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5 Results
Results of the scenarios analysis using RESMIP model are illustrated in this chapter.
Outcomes from the economic analysis stage and the support mechanisms qualitative
scenarios assessment stage are used to show the implication of each scenario on in-
vestment and operation. The financial indicators calculation results are illustrated in
absolute values and as percentages of the change in value in comparison with the ref-
erence scenario .
It is also important to highlight that it depends on the investor to evaluate whether
the NPV,IRR,LCOE or DSCR amount is acceptable or not for the economic feasibility
of the investment. A Zero or positive NPV (NPV≥ 0) gives an indication that the
revenues are covering the project costs over the lifetime of the project and the invest-
ment can be profitable under a certain discount rate. Investor can have a minimum
required IRR, which means that a lower value than the required minimum IRR value
makes the investment infeasible. However, various types of investors can have different
minimum IRR for the same project depending on the risk perception. The LCOE
can be compared to the amount of remuneration paid and in case it is lower this will
reflect the possibility of making profit, in addition it is used as a base of assessment to
compare different electricity generation technologies. DSCR value is compared to the
minimum value desired by debt. If it is higher so the investment risks are acceptable
from debt perspective. However, as shown before in table 4.5 that the minimum DSCR
varies depending on the RES-E technology, and it can also be different from one type of
investor to another. Because of these reasons a clear statement regarding the economic
feasibility of investment can not be made using the results below.
On the other hand the implications of the different scenarios can be clearly recog-
nized. So conclusions and recommendations regarding the general implications of the
Wind Onshore and PV support mechanisms on investment and operational can be
made. Which is important to take into consideration by policy makers while designing
new support mechanisms for RES-E, and fulfill the main objectives of the study.
5.1 Wind Onshore Scenarios Assessment Results
5.1.1 Regulated FIT (reference Scenario)
For the selected Onshore Wind case study input parameters shown in table 4.16, the
financial indicator calculations results are as following. The calculated NPV for the
reference scenario is 3.8152 Mile, as shown in figure 5.1, the IRR calculated value is
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Figure 5.1: Wind Onshore NPV scenarios analysis results
18.01%, the LCOE is 72.13 e/MWh and the DSCR is 1.83% 1.
As explained in section 4.2.1, the FIT (Reg) is very successful mechanism to encour-
age investing in RES-E technologies. There are no price risks associated with it, as the
investors are isolated from the electricity market prices volatility with a guaranteed
long term contracts along the lifetime of the project. In addition, as the production
dispatching is guaranteed for RES-E electricity, there are no quantity risks as well.
These are the main reasons of making the FIT (Reg) a successful mechanism on the
level of RES-E investment, since the StrEG policy have been changed to the FIT from
the year 2000 onwards [BN08]. This positive impact on investment is reflected on the
RES-E deployment in Germany as the share of RES is total gross electricity consump-
tion reached 23.6% in the year 2012 [BMU12b].
On the other hand, the implication of FIT (Reg) on the market economic efficiency is
negative. The costs related to the market risks, whether the reasons behind these risks
became reality or not, are transferred from the generators to the end customer who
have to burden these extra costs as an impeded cost in the electricity price provided
for him by the retailer represented as a part of the EEG levy.
Moreover, the FIT (Reg) mechanism does not create any incentive for the opera-
1 The financial indicators calculation results are summarized in table 4.18 for all the Wind onshore
scenarios.
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Figure 5.2: Wind Onshore NPV results comparison against the reference scenario
tors to appropriately react to the market signals, or even having the wellness to gain
experience regarding the market dynamics, demand behaviour and electricity prices
volatility. Such operation attitude does not support the future integration of RES-E
technologies on the market and system levels, making the sustainable development of
RES-E shares in the electricity consumption, and reaching the future scenario targets
in a economic efficient manner arguable.
5.1.2 Regulated Market Premium ex-post
In the MPexpost (Reg) scenario, The project NPV is 2.6975 Mile as presented in figure
5.1. Compared to the reference scenario NPV there is a decrease of -1.1177 Mile . As
shown in figure 5.2 the reduction in the NPV under the MPexpost (Reg) compared
to the reference scenario is -30%. However there is a decrease in the NPV which is
a project general financial indicator that gives an indication for both equity and debt
regarding the future cashflow of the project along the lifetime, but the project is still
profitable as the NPV is above zero.
The Calculated IRR the MPexpost (Reg) scenario is 15.8% which is lower by around
-12% compared to the reference scenario as shown in figure 5.3. Depending on the
minimum required IRR by investor the investment will still be feasible or not. However,
as the IRR is much higher than the WACC (6.3%), this gives an impression that the
profitability of the investment could be secured. On the other hand, Compared to the
reference scenario, there is a decrease on the IRR value. This situation can make the
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Figure 5.3: Wind Onshore IRR results under the different support mechanisms scenar-
ios and change compared to the reference scenario
investment less attractive than in case of the reference scenario, or require higher share
of debt with low required rate of return.
The decrease in the NPV and IRR values is due to the price and quantity risk levels,
which results in a WACC that is higher than the reference case as shown in table
4.14, and lower capacity factor as shown in the case study input parameter table (see
appendix (a)). Nevertheless, MPexpost (Reg) can result in the same or higher NPV and
IRR in case of direct marketing scheme, as discussed before in the support mechanisms
assessment section, but the adapted case in the analysis includes the possible risks that
can be taken into consideration from investment and operation sides.
The LCOE value slightly increased by 5.7% in the MPexpost (Reg) compared to
the reference scenario to reach 76 e/MWh as shown in figure 5.4. The increase in the
LCOE is mainly due to the reduction in the electricity production due to the quantity
risks. Although that the O&M costs will be reduced, which will result in reducing the
overall yearly costs of the project, but the lower production effect on the LCOE is still
higher as other project related costs are not reduced.
The DSCR calculated value under the MPexpost is 1.73%. Although that the debt
related financial figures (rd,gd, debt term) did not change from the reference case to
the MPexpost but there is a decrease in the DSCR by around -5% as shown in figure
5.5. This decrease is due to the changes in the annual cashflow ( net operating income)
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Figure 5.4: Wind Onshore LCOE calculation results under different support mechanism
scenarios and changes compared to the reference scenario
due to the changes in the WACC and capacity factor. In general the DSCR is higher
than 1%, which means that there is enough cashflow to fulfill the debt repayment obli-
gations. Moreover, the DSCR value is higher than 1.3% which is the required DSCR
for Wind Onshore in Germany as shown in table 4.5. The DSCR is lower than the
reference case which can result in limiting the debt ratio or applying some restrictions
on the plant operation from the debt side.
The financial indicators values changed slight compared to the reference scenario .
This gives a conclusion that the investment attractiveness is not to be dramatically
affected under the MPexpost (Reg). On the contrary, it the case in the Germany elec-
tricity market an estimated 68% of all on and off shore wind power production in 2012
was reimbursed according to the Market premium scheme [GP13a]. Moreover, the MP-
expost (Reg) creates an incentive for extra investment in making the plant remotely
controlled through defining a specific remuneration level for the remotely controlled
plants. This have an implication on the system level of having a real-time knowledge
of the status of each plant and give enough flexibility to utilize the production.
On the operation side, can provide the operators with experience regarding the mar-
ket dynamics and prices, which can be the foundation of fully integrating RES-E into
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Figure 5.5: Wind Onshore DSCR results for different support mechanisms scenarios
and changes compared to the reference scenario
the market. On the other side, quantity risks due to output curtailment possibility
exist, which affects the economic feasibility of the project.
It can be concluded that the MPexpost can guarantee the investment in RES-E
as in the feed-in tariff, and provide the operators with market dynamics and prices
experience, but in a high cost due to over compensation possibilities as discussed in
section 4.2.1.
5.1.3 Regulated Market Premium ex-ante
The calculated NPV for the MPexante Scenario is 1.7507 Mile as presented in figure
5.1, this value is reduced by -2.0645 Mile, which is -54% lower than the reference
scenario NPV as shown in figure 5.2. The NPV is higher than Zero, so the project can
still be profitable.
The IRR is reduced by around -25% compared the reference scenario to be 13.3% as
shown in figure 5.3. The IRR is higher than the WACC (7.8%), this gives an impression
that the investment profitability can be secured.
The main reasons of having a lower NPV and IRR compared to both the reference
and the MPexpost (Reg) scenarios, is that the amount of risks associated with the
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MPexante resulted in a calculated WACC and almost the same level of quantity risks
as in the MPexpost, which means a lower capacity factor and electricity production
per year as shown in the MPexante case study input parameters table (see appendix
(a)).
As illustrated in figure 5.4 the LCOE under the MPexante (Reg) scenario is 80
e/MWh. It increased by 11% compared to the reference scenario. This increase is
not only due to the change in the amount of electricity production as a consequence
of the quantity risks; but also due to the increase in the annual project costs due to
the change in the capital structure. Although that the O&M costs are reduced as
production decreases, but still the other LCOE calculation parameters effects is higher
than the reduction in the O&M costs. The calculated LCOE is lower than the assumed
remuneration amount (91 e/MWh).
The calculated DSCR for the MPexante scenario is 1.75%. It was expected due to
the higher risk levels in the MPexante that the DSCR will be lower in the MPexante
than the MPexpost. However, due to the new debt financial figures structure as shown
in the case study input parameters table (see appendix (a)), the share of debt is limited
to 65% with slightly higher rate of return than in the reference scenario, because of
the higher uncertainties related to price risks as explained in section 4.2.1. This new
capital structure result in a DSCR, which is -4.3% lower than the reference scenario
DSCR and slightly higher than the MPexpost (Reg) scenario. In general the DSCR is
higher than 1%, which means that there is enough cashflow to fulfill the debt repay-
ment obligations. Moreover, the DSCR value is higher than 1.3% which is the required
DSCR for Wind Onshore in Germany as shown in table 4.5.
The MPexante (Reg) can have some advantages over the FIT (Reg) and the MP-
expost (Reg) regarding the quality of market proceeds and the transfer of price risks
to the end customer (and other advantages) as illustrated in table 4.7. Yet on the
investment and operation sides; the MPexante has more disadvantages than advan-
tages. The decreases in the NPV of the project future cash flows and the IRR due
to the higher uncertainties and price risk levels compared to the reference scenario, in
addition to the increase in the LCOE, can have an effect on the wellness of investment
under such scenario, as the differences in the NPV and IRR compared to the reference
scenario quantities are considerable. The only positive indication in the analysis is that
the DSCR value is higher than the MPexpost (Reg), but the difference between the
two quantities can not be considerable in terms of influencing the debt side decision of
preferring one scenario over the other. And still the MPexante DSCR lower than the
reference scenario value.
There are benefits regarding operation, as the MPexante (Reg) support the complete
market integration of RES-E and creates an incentive for increasing the quality of
demand side forecasting, which can help maintaining more demand oriented feeding
of electricity and increase the grid stability as illustrated in section 4.2.1. But on the
other side, such operation behaviour can not be practically maintained as operators
still do not have clear incentive to curtail the production rather than the high negative
prices as in the case of the MPexpost (Reg). So the quantity risk still exist without
any additional benefits on changing the operation behaviour. This results in leaving
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the MPexante (Reg) without any significant effect on the operation side compared to
the FIT (Reg) as in the MPexpost (Reg) case.
5.1.4 Regulated Capacity Payment
The NPV calculated for the CP (Reg) scenario is 0.0925 Mile. As shown in figure 5.1
this value is lower than the reference scenario NPV by -3.7227 Mile. This means that
there is a -97% difference in the NPV between the CP (Reg) and the reference scenario
as seen in figure 5.2. As the NPV is slightly higher than Zero, the project profitability
could be questionable.
The IRR value under the CP (Reg) scenario is 10.9%, this value is -39% lower than
the reference scenario IRR as presented in figure 5.3. The calculated WACC for the
CP (Reg) scenario is 10.6% as can be seen in the case study input parameters table
(see appendix (a)) and table 4.14. Although that the IRR is higher than the WACC,
but the gap between the two values is very low (0.3%), which increase the uncertainty
of whether this investment is profitable or not.
The WACC value reflects the price risks on investment in the CP (Reg) scenario.
Due to the high WACC compared to the reference scenario combined with the quantity
risk factors in that scenario, the decrease of the NPV and the IRR is significantly high
compared to the reference scenario and the other regulated scenarios.
LCOE increased by 25% compared to the reference scenario, to reach 90 e/MWh.
This is due to the different quantity risks under the CP (Reg) scenario, in addition to
the increase in the annual costs due to the higher required rate of returns as shown in
table 4.2.1 and in the case study input parameters table in appendix (a). The LCOE
is almost equal to the assumed total remuneration (91 e/MWh).
The calculated value for the DSCR is 1.69%, this value decreased with -7.5% com-
pared to the reference scenario. Despite the share of the debt is limited to 60% due to
the uncertainties related to the future cashflow; but on the other hand, the required
return rate on it increased to 9.0% due to the price risk factors, and lower annual cash
flow (net operating income). That is why the DSCR examined such a decrease in it’s
value compared to the reference scenario. In general the DSCR is higher than 1%,
which means that there is enough cashflow to fulfill the debt repayment obligations.
Moreover, the DSCR value is higher than 1.3% which is the required DSCR for Wind
Onshore in Germany as shown in table 4.5.
In general among the regulated support mechanism scenarios, the CP (Reg) case
reported the lowest project financial indicators on both equity and debt sides. This is
due to the high level of price risks associated with such a scenario, and in addition to
the different quantity risk factors as illustrated in section 4.2.1. The NPV and IRR
of the project are very low and the LCOE is almost approaching the total assumed
remuneration amount, this can threaten the wellness of investment in such a risky en-
vironment, specially for private investors who do not have a portfolio of investments
that can reduces the overall investment risk. The DSCR did not experience a dramatic
change in that case, this is due the reasons mentioned before. However, the debt share
limitation and higher required rate of return reflects that the project can be financed
but with high debt obligations.
82
On the operation level there are many disadvantages (in case a remote production
control option is not integrated in the plant) which can reduce the potential of con-
tributing positively to the grid stability as explained in section 4.2.1 . Moreover, there
is a doughy that operators will react to negative price signals, as long as the capacity
payment amount can guarantee making profit.
CP (Reg) can have some advantages on the level of capacity availability and supply
reliability, in addition regarding the possibility of generating revenues, and decreasing
the volitionality of wholesale energy prices as explained in section 4.2.1.
5.1.5 Auctioned FIT
As shown in figure 5.1, the NPV under the FIT (Auc) is 3.611 Mile this value is only
-5 % lower than the reference scenario as seen in figure 5.2. As the NPV is higher than
Zero, the project can still be profitable.
The calculated IRR is 18%, which is the same value as in the reference scenario. The
IRR is higher than the WACC (6.2%), this gives an impression that the investment
profitability can be secured.
The change in the NPV is due to the slight increase in WACC compared to the
reference scenario as shown in table 4.14. This increase is due to the new price risk
factor introduced under the FIT (Auc) as explained in section 4.2.1.
The LCOE under the FIT (Auc scenario) is 72 e/MWh as shown in figure 5.4, which
is the same as in the reference scenario. There is no change in the plant production as
there is no quantity risks associated with the FIT (Reg) scenario, in addition that the
change in the annual project costs (because of the discount rate changes) is very small
compared to the reference scenario. The calculated LCOE is lower than the assumed
remuneration amount (91 e/MWh).
DSCR value has no change from the reference scenario as shown in figure 5.5, as
there is no changes in debt financial requirements and the change in the annual cash-
flow due to the increase of the WACC is low. In general the DSCR is higher than 1%,
which means that there is enough cashflow to fulfill the debt repayment obligations.
Moreover, the DSCR value is higher than 1.3% which is the required DSCR for Wind
Onshore in Germany as shown in table 4.5.
The FIT (Auc) scenario seems theoretically optimal, as it can benefit from the key
advantages of auctioning as listed in table 4.8, of enabling higher degree of subsidy
efficiency and remove the burden of defining the right remuneration from the regula-
tor. However, there is uncertainty regarding the sufficiency of the remuneration level
for completing the project, which introduce a price risk on investment as illustrated
in table 4.9. Specially in order to be able to depend on it in estimating the sufficient
remuneration amount in a competitive market environment. This can lead to increase
the investment in certain RES-E technologies over another, which can affects the gen-
eration system in the future as discussed before in section 4.2.1. On the other hand, in
case the estimated remuneration is not sufficient, this can make the profit generation
from the project questionable.
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On the other hand, from the operation side, there are no quantity risks associated
with the FIT (Auc). This can result in the same disadvantages in the FIT (Reg)
reference scenario of isolating the operation from the market prices and reducing the
incentives for integrating the RES-E on the market and system levels as discussed in
section 4.2.1.
5.1.6 Auctioned Market Premium ex-post
The NPV calculated for the MPexpost (Auc) scenario as shown in figure 5.1 is 1.3471
Mile. Compared to the reference scenario this value is -65% lower as shown in fig 5.2.
The NPV is higher than Zero, so the project can still be profitable.
The IRR under this scenario is also reduced by -32% compared to the reference
scenario, the calculated IRR value is 12% as shown in figure 5.3. The IRR is higher
than the WACC which is 7.8%, this gives an impression that the investment profitability
can be secured.
The reduction in the NPV and IRR is reflecting the higher price and quantity risks
associated with the MPexpost (Auc). The WACC is higher compared to the reference
scenario as shown in table 4.14 , and the capacity factor is reduced by 2 % as can be
seen in the MPexpost (Auc) scenario case study input parameter table (see appendix
(a)). These assumptions reduces the net cashflow and resulting in lowering the NPV
and IRR.
The resultant LCOE increases by 14% in the MPexpost (Auc) scenario compared
to the reference scenario. As shown in figure 5.4 the calculated value of the LCOE
is 82 e/MWh. In spit of this increase, but the cost is still lower than the remunera-
tion assumed to be amount paid2. The calculated LCOE is lower than the assumed
remuneration amount (91 e/MWh).
As shown in figure 5.5, the DSCR related to the MPexpost (Auc) scenario is 1.7%.
This value is slightly lower than the reference scenario DSCR by -6.6%. As the debt
share is limited to 65% and the required rate of return have not been changed signifi-
cantly from the reference scenario as shown in table 4.14. The DSCR is higher than 1%,
which means that there is enough cashflow to fulfill the debt repayment obligations.
Moreover, the DSCR value is higher than 1.3% which is the required DSCR for Wind
Onshore in Germany as shown in table 4.5.
Regarding the implications on investment, the financial indicators results for the
MPexpost (Auc) scenario shows that the project economic feasibility is highly affected
compared to both the reference and MPexpost (Reg) scenarios. This is due to the
higher uncertainties related to the price risk factors as shown in table 4.9. Even under
the direct marketing scheme there is uncertainty regarding profit making, as the auc-
tion outcome is unknown.
On the operation side, the MPexpost (Auc) scenario does not provide a clear incen-
tive for demand oriented feeding of electricity. Curtailing of production is done based
on voluntarily bases due to the quantity risks. That is why there is no clear advantage
2 The assumed remuneration is 91 e/MWh as shown in the case study input parameters table in
the appendix
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of the MPexpost (Auc) scenario the investment or operation compared to the reference
and MPexpost(Reg) scenarios.
On the Market level, there is a high possibility that the main advantage of achieving
higher degree of subsidy efficiency through auctions can not be achieved. As the auction
is done after the electricity is sold in the market, it give the generators an advantage
to ask for high remuneration level, even higher than what is really needed in order to
maximize the profits. This also can motivate the generators to create market power
through cooperation in order to control the bids and influence the minimum amount
of remuneration in the auctioning process. In addition, the costs and efforts related
to running and managing a monthly or even yearly auctioning process can affect the
economic efficiency of such a scenario, and create a burden of handling these costs and
efforts on the regulator.
The quantitative assessment3 and economic analysis of the MPexpost (Auc) scenario,
clearly give an indication that there are more related disadvantages than the advantages
not only on the investment and operation levels, but also on the electricity market
economic efficiency.
5.1.7 Auctioned Market Premium ex-ante
The difference between the Calculated NPV for the MPexante (0.8348 Mile) and the
reference scenario NPV is -2.9804 Mile as shown in figure 5.1. This value means that
the NPV is -78% lower than the reference scenario NPV as shown in figure 5.2. The
project can still be profitable, as the NPV is higher than Zero.
IRR calculated value is 11.6%, which is -35.5% lower than the reference scenario IRR
as shown in figure 5.3. The IRR is higher than the WACC which is 8.7% this gives an
impression that the investment profitability can be secured.
This reduction in values is due to the reduction in the annual cashflow, as the WACC
increases as shown in table 4.14, and the plant production is affected with the quantity
risks as discussed in section 4.2.1.
The LCOE increased by 18% compared to the reference scenario. It reaches 85
e/MWh as shown in figure 5.4. This increase is due to the changes in the capacity
factor, which causes a reduction in the annual energy produced. In addition to the
increase of annual costs due to the high required WACC as shown in the MPexante
(Auc) case study input parameters table the appendix (a). The calculated LCOE is
not much lower than the assumed remuneration amount (91 e/MWh).
As shown in figure 5.5 the calculated DSCR for the MPexante (Auc) scenario is
1.66%, which is lower than the reference scenario DSCR by -9.5%. Unlikely in the
MPexante (Reg) scenario, the DSCR calculated under the MPexante (Auc) scenario
is not higher than the MPexpost (Auc) case, as the capital structure difference af-
fected the DSCR in that case. The share of debt is the same as in the MPexpost
(Auc) scenario, but due to the price risk the debt required rate of return is higher
than the reference and the MPexpost scenarios. This higher required rate of return
3 As explained in section 4.2.1
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increases the debt repayment annual amount. In addition, the cashflow is affected by
the higher annual costs than in the MPexpost (Auc) case. The DSCR is higher than
1%, which means that there is enough cashflow to fulfill the debt repayment obliga-
tions. Moreover, the DSCR value is higher than 1.3% which is the required DSCR for
Wind Onshore in Germany as shown in table 4.5.
The MPexante (Auc) scenario create higher level of price risks on investment than
in the reference and the MPexante (Reg) scenarios. As shown in table 4.9, investors
have not only to bear the forecasting risks on revenues, but also the risk of insufficient
remuneration estimation as the bids are submitted in a competitive environment and
the only low bids are adapted. As can be seen from the financial indicators results, the
investment attractiveness is highly affected due to the high reduction in the NPV and
IRR, in addition to the increase in the LCOE. This can encourage private investors
to consider other investment opportunities with lower risks, or to require higher share
of lower return financing capital from debt. However, due to the uncertainties in the
cashflow it is doubted that the share of debt will be increased, and even if it is in-
creased higher required rate of return than what have been assumed in that case will
be required in correspond to the risk levels. This will result in lowering the calculated
DSCR, and the acceptance of financing the project can be questionable. Moreover, as
explained in section 4.2.1, there are more quantity risk factors under the MPexante
(Auc) scenario than in the MPexante (Reg) scenario.
Regarding the implication on operation, it is challenging but can be argued that
the scenario creates an incentive for improving the quality of forecasting the demand
behaviour on the long-term, as the bids will be submitted on ex-ante bases in a com-
petitive auction. So the operators have a previous expectation regarding when the
demand is high and need to be fulfillled, and when there is an excessive supply and
profits can not possibility be made. In addition, a disadvantage on operation is that
the same risks of having high negative prices exist, which will lead to a voluntarily
curtailment of production if the remuneration is exhausted. But it is an advantage for
the system integration of RES-E into the electricity market.
The advantages of auctioning on the market economic efficiency level , as higher
subsidy efficiency and removing the burden of defining the remuneration from the reg-
ulator side, or over compensating the production due to high level of remuneration can
be obtained in the MPexante (Auc) scenario.
As a conclusion, due to the high price and quantity risks in the MPexante (Auc) sce-
nario, the project economic feasibility and investment wellness can highly be affected.
However, the advantages of auctioning can be obtained and it can be argued that it
will have a positive effect on the operation toward being more demand oriented, which
may support integrating the RES-E generation on the market and systems levels.
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5.1.8 Auctioned Capacity Payment
In the CP (Auc) scenario, the NPV has a negative value of -1.1205 Mile as shown in
figure 5.1, this value is different than the reference scenario NPV by -4.9357 Mile, which
is -129% as presented in figure 5.2. The NPV in that case is lower than Zero, which
means that there is no possibility for the project to be profitable, and the investment
costs are higher than the revenues over the project lifetime.
The calculated IRR is 7.5 %,this value is lower than the IRR of the reference scenario
by around -58% as shown in figure 5.3. There is a big gap between the IRR and the
WACC which is 11.7%, this means that the profitability of the project is unsecured
under the discount rate (which is the WACC) defined in that case.
The NPV and IRR have been highly affected due to the high price and quantity
risks in the CP (Auc) scenario as shown in table 4.9, and the high WACC as shown in
table 4.14.
The LCOE is 100 e/MWh, this value is higher than the remuneration amount paid4.
Even that the annual O&M costs are reduced due to the reduction in the annual
production (as a consequence of the quantity risks impact on the capacity factor) as
shown in the CP(Auc) case study input parameter table (see appendix (a)), which
can participate in reducing the annual costs and the LCOE. On the other hand, the
high WACC and the reduction in the energy production have a higher impact on
the LCOE that the O&M costs reduction, which leads to such increase in the LCOE
value compared to the reference and CP (Reg) scenarios. The increase in the LCOE
compared to the reference scenario is 39% as shown in figure 5.4.
The DSCR have reduced by around -20% compared to the reference scenario and it’s
calculated value is 1.47% as presented in figure 5.5. The DSCR is be highly affected
under the CP (Auc) scenario and to reach a value lower than 1.00%, due to the negative
NPV. However, due to the assumption of limiting the debt share to 60% as shown in
table 4.14 because of the uncertainty in the future cashflow as explained in section 4.9.
The DSCR is higher than 1%, which means that there is enough cashflow to fulfill the
debt repayment obligations. Moreover, the DSCR value is slightly higher than 1.3%
which is the required DSCR for Wind Onshore in Germany as shown in table 4.5.
It can be clearly seen that the investment economic feasibility is highly affected in
this scenario, even in that case the financial indicators that reflect the investment can
not be profitable due to the low IRR, negative NPV, in addition to the high LCOE.
From the debt perspective the project still can meet it’s repayment obligations but
only under the assumptions that have been made for the debt financial figures. It can
be highly uncertain that the scenario will provide the incentive of investment to reach
the needed Wind Onshore capacity available targets to guarantee a reliable supply of
energy. In addition, an incentive for making extra investment to make the available
capacity remotely controlled in order to obtain the system flexibility in using this ca-
pacity when it is needed, needs a clear incentive or special compensation as in the
case of the current structure of the German market premium ex-post. It can be also
daughter than taking advantage of increasing the degree of subsidy efficiency can be
obtained. As there is an incentive of creating cooperation between investors to influ-
4 The assumption is the total remuneration assumed to be paid is 91 e/MWh.
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ence the auctioning process through using market powers, and take advantage of high
proposing bids with high desired remuneration in order to maximize the profits. This
can also be an incentive for the big market player to participate, and make it harder
for private investors to participate in the market.
On operation side, although that there is an exposure to market prices but as long
as the capacity payment remuneration can guarantee making profits, the operators will
not react to market signals until the remuneration is exhausted by the negative prices.
However, it can be argued that as the available capacity needed is defined by the reg-
ulator and the required capacity payment is granted based on the auction results. As
a consequence the supply and demand will match and the likelihood of having nega-
tive prices due to excessive supply will be reduced in that case, and that would be an
advantage for both operation and grid stability sides.
But to support this argument the regulator must defining exactly the needed available
capacity and give an incentive to make it fully monitored and controllable by the system
operator who will be responsible for balancing the grid. This will increase the burden
that the regulator would handle, in addition to the increase in costs, which can have an
influence on the economic efficiency of the electricity market, and at the end tax payers
and end customer have to pay for these costs in case they exist, which will increase the
burden on them as well. Due to this it can be costly and hard to achieve even the main
objective of having available capacity in order to maintain higher a reliable supply of
energy.
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5.2 PV Scenarios Assessment Results
Most of the arguments stated in the Wind Onshore case regarding the directional in-
fluence of the different support mechanisms scenarios are applicable on the PV case
as well. But there is a difference between the two cases (Wind onshore and PV) in
the absolute values of the financial indicator results, and in the relative changes in
percentage for each scenario compared to the reference scenario.
The difference in the financial results between the Wind Onshore and PV scenarios
is due to three main reasons: the technological difference, the selected case study plant
location and capacity, and the energy resource availability difference between solar and
wind. These differences can be recognized in the PV case financial results as: First,
the project NPV and IRR absolute values are lower because of the effect of the of the
above mentioned difference factors on the cashflow (revenues and costs) of the project.
Second, the LCOE is much higher than in the wind onshore, this is mainly due to the
solar resource nature which affects the amount of energy production, but on the other
side the project costs are not affected (O&M and investment costs are fixed) which re-
sults in a high LCOE. third, the DSCR is lower than 1% in all the scenarios (including
the reference scenario). This is because of the project do not produce enough revenues
(in that particular case study) than the costs, which lower the cashflow (net operat-
ing income) and result in that there is no enough cashflow to meet the debt obligations5.
Despite these financial values differences, investing in PV can not be replaced by
investing in Wind Onshore, due to the higher NPV, IRR and DSCR and lower LCOE
of the Wind Onshore. because first both technology are needed in building the optimal
renewable energy mix. There are locations where PV is more efficient than Wind,
because of the availability of the resource in that location, or the plant size restrictions
(for example supplying a building with a roof top or building integrated PV). Sec-
ond, the remuneration is adjusted for each RES-E technology to make the investment
attractive in the locations which provide enough resources. Third, without making
investment it will be hard to move the technology from the R&D phase to the market
maturity and take the associated costs down, as the learning curve and experiences
related to this technology will not be further developed.
The difference between the Wind Onshore and PV relative changes in percentage for
each scenario compared to the reference scenario, is because the PV related financial
assumptions for each scenario like the debt and equity shares, required rate of return,
the WACC and the concept of defining the O&M costs, are different from the Wind
Onshore assumptions as illustrated in table 4.14. This makes the PV and Wind Onshore
cases different from the financial point of view, but still the risks of different support
mechanisms and conclusions regarding the implications of each scenario on investment
and operation are generally as argued in the Wind Onshore section.
5 It is important to be taken into consideration that the project grant was removed due to the reasons
explained in section 4.2.3.
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Figure 5.6: PV NPV results for different support mechanism scenarios
5.2.1 Regulated FeedIn-Tariff (reference scenario)
The input parameters for the PV reference scenario case study are shown in table 4.17.
The results of financial indicators calculations are 1.9487 Mile, for the NPV, 9.8% for
the IRR, 344 e/MWh for the LCOE, and 0.89% for the DSCR6.
The NPV is higher than Zero which indicates that the investment can be profitable.
Also there is a gap between the IRR and the WACC (4.4%), in addition the LCOE
is lower that the assumed remuneration value (which is 457 e/MWh), which gives an
impression that making profits can be secured. The DSCR is lower than 1%, that may
have an influence on the debt decision of financing the project.
The implications for the reference scenario on investment and operation are as illus-
trated before in the Wind case in section 5.1. Investment is highly secured under this
scenario, but there is no incentive for operators to react to market signals as they are
isolated from the market prices.
5.2.2 Regulated Market Premium ex-post
The NPV calculated for the MPexpost (Reg) scenario is 1.0037 Mile, as shown in
figure 5.6. This value is reduced by -48.5% compared to the reference scenario NPV as
6 The financial indicators calculation results are summarized in table 4.19 for all the PV scenarios.
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Figure 5.7: PV NPV results comparison against the reference scenario
presented in figure 5.7. The IRR calculated is 7.5% for the MPexpost (Reg) scenario,
this value is -23 % lower than the reference scenario. The reduction in these values is
due to the same reasons illustrated in the Wind Onshore MPexpost (Reg) scenario.
As presented in figure 5.9, the LCOE increase by 13% compared to the reference
scenario, to reach 390 e/MWh. this increase is due to the same risk implications
explained in the Wind Onshore section.
The DSCR for the MPexpost (Reg) is 0.79%, this value is -11% lower than the DSCR
in the reference scenario as shown in figure 5.10. The reduction in the DSCR is due to
the same reasons illustrated in the Wind Onshore MPexpost (Reg) scenario.
In the MPexpost (Reg) scenario, the NPV is higher than Zero which indicates that
the investment can be profitable. Also there is a gap between the IRR and the WACC
(4.7%), in addition the LCOE is lower that the assumed remuneration value (which
is 457 e/MWh), which gives an impression that making profits can be secured. The
DSCR is lower than 1%, that may have an influence on the debt decision of financing
the project.
As explained in details before in the Wind Onshore section, the investment attrac-
tiveness will not be dramatically affected compared to the reference scenario, and
regarding operation the MPexpost (Reg) scenario provide operators with experiences
regarding market dynamics and prices, but do not create a dramatic change in the
operation behaviour compared to the reference scenario.
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Change in IRR (%)
Figure 5.8: PV IRR results for different support mechanism scenarios and changes com-
pared to the reference scenario
5.2.3 Regulated Market Premium ex-ante
The calculated NPV for the MPexante (Reg) scenario is 0.1895 Mile, as shown in
figure 5.6. The difference between this value and the reference scenario NPV is -1.7592
Mile, this means that the NPV is reduced by -90% compared to the reference scenario
NPV as shown in figure 5.7. The calculated IRR is 6.4 %. As shown in figure 5.8 this
value is -34.7% lower than the reference scenario IRR. The LCOE calculated is 442
e/MWh, which is 28.5% higher than the reference scenario LCOE as shown in figure
5.9. The reasons for NPV and IRR reduction, and the increase in the LCOE are as
previously explained in the Wind Onshore Mpexante (Reg) scenario.
In the MPexante (Reg) scenario, the NPV is slightly higher than Zero which indi-
cates that the investment can be profitable. Also there is a small gap between the
IRR and the WACC (5.9%), in addition the LCOE is slightly lower that the assumed
remuneration value (which is 457 e/MWh), which gives an impression that making
profits can be (but not highly) secured. The DSCR is lower than 1%, that may have
an influence on the debt decision of financing the project.
Implications on investment and operation is in the same direction as in the Wind On-
shore case. Investment wellness can be highly affected under this scenario. Moreover,
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Figure 5.9: PV LCOE results for different support mechanism scenarios and changes
compared to the reference scenario
there are no additional benefits regarding changing the operation behaviour. MPex-
ante (Reg) scenario have other implications as well, which are illustrated in the Wind
Onshore section.
5.2.4 Regulated Capacity Payment
As shown in figure 5.6, the value of the NPV for the CP(Reg) scenario is -1.3107
Mile. This negative NPV is lower by -167% compared to the reference scenario NPV
as shown in figure 5.7. The IRR calculated value is 4.2%, this value is reduced by
-57 % compared to the reference scenario IRR as shown in figure 5.8. As presented in
figure 5.9, the LCOE increases by 71% compared to the reference scenario, to reach
590 e/MWh. this increase is due to the same risk implications explained in the Wind
Onshore CP(Reg). The DSCR value is 0.7%, it is reduced by -21% compared to the
reference scenario DSCR as shown in figure 5.10.
The NPV is lower than Zero which indicates that the investment can not be prof-
itable. The IRR is lower than the WACC (8.6%), in addition the LCOE is higher that
the assumed remuneration value (which is 457 e/MWh), which gives an impression
that making profits can not be secured. The DSCR is lower than 1%, that may have
an influence on the debt decision of financing the project.
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Figure 5.10: PV DSCR results for different support mechanism scenarios and changes
compared to the reference scenario
Generally the implications of the CP (Reg) on investment and operation is in the
same direction as in the Wind Onshore case. The economic feasibility of the project
were highly affected in the PV case. On the operation level making profit can be
guaranteed even in the existence of negative prices in the market, as long as the remu-
neration form the capacity payment is not exhausted.
5.2.5 Auctioned FIT
As shown in figure 5.6, the value of the NPV for the FIT (Auc) scenario is 1.8337 Mile.
This value is lower by -6% compared to the reference scenario NPV as shown in figure
5.7. The IRR calculated value is the same as in the reference scenario 9.8% as shown in
figure 5.8. As presented in figure 5.9, the LCOE slightly increased by 1.2% compared
to the reference scenario, to reach 348 e/MWh. The DSCR value is the same as in
the reference scenario 0.89% as shown in figure 5.10.
In the FIT (Auc) scenario, the NPV is higher than Zero which indicates that the
investment can be profitable. There is a gap between the IRR and the WACC (4.6%),
in addition the LCOE is lower that the assumed remuneration value (which is 457
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e/MWh), which gives an impression that making profits can be secured. The DSCR is
lower than 1%, that may have an influence on the debt decision of financing the project.
As in the Wind Onshore FIT (Auc) scenario, there are slight changes in NPV and
LCOE, but the IRR and DSCR share the same values with the reference scenario. This
is due to the price risks introduced under the FIT (Auc) scenario as explained in the
Wind Onshore case.
The implications of the FIT (Auc) scenario on the investment and operation are
in the same directions effect as in the Onshore Wind FIT(Auc) scenario. Investment
economic feasibility is not affected, but on the other hand as operation is isolated from
the market prices, there is no incentive to have demand oriented behaviour.
5.2.6 Auctioned Market Premium ex-post
The calculated NPV for the MPexpost (Auc) scenario is -0.3224 Mile, as shown in
figure 5.6. The difference between this value and the reference scenario NPV is -2.2711
Mile, this means that the NPV is reduced by -116% compared to the reference sce-
nario NPV as shown in figure 5.7. The calculated IRR is 4.7%. As shown in figure 5.8
this value is -52% lower than the reference scenario IRR. The LCOE calculated is 484
e/MWh, which is 40.7% higher than the reference scenario LCOE as shown in figure
5.9. Figure 5.10 shows that the DSCR decreased by -19% compared to the reference
scenario. The calculated value for the DSCR is 0.72%.
The NPV is lower than Zero which indicates that the investment can not be prof-
itable. The IRR is slightly lower than the WACC (5.7%), in addition the LCOE is
slightly higher that the assumed remuneration value (which is 457 e/MWh), which
gives an impression that making profits can not be secured. The DSCR is lower than
1%, that may have an influence on the debt decision of financing the project.
The project feasibility is highly affected. In addition, there is no clear incentive
for demand oriented operation behaviour. In general the MPexpost (Auc) scenario
implications on investment and operation will lead to the same directional consequences
as explained in the Wind Onshore MPexpost (Auc).
5.2.7 Auctioned Market Premium ex-ante
As shown in figure 5.6, the value of the NPV for the FIT (Auc) scenario is -0.6511
Mile. This negative NPV represents a reduction of -133% compared to the reference
scenario NPV as shown in figure 5.7. The IRR calculated value is 4.3%, this value is
reduced by -56% compared to the reference scenario IRR as shown in figure 5.8. As
presented in figure 5.9, the LCOE has 50% increase compared to the reference scenario;
The calculated LCOE value is 516 e/MWh. The DSCR calculated value is 0.69%, it is
reduced by -22.5% compared to the reference scenario DSCR as shown in figure 5.10.
The NPV is lower than Zero which indicates that the investment can not be prof-
itable. The IRR is lower than the WACC (6.39%), in addition the LCOE is slightly
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higher that the assumed remuneration value (which is 457 e/MWh), which gives an
impression that making profits can not be secured. The DSCR is lower than 1%, that
may have an influence on the debt decision of financing the project.
The changes in the financial results is because of the MPexante scenario risks, capital
structure changes and WACC increase 7 implications as discussed before in section 5.1
under the Wind Onshore MPexante (Auc) scenario.
Under the MPexante (Auc) scenario, the project feasibility is affected in the PV
case to a higher extent that in the Wind Onshore case. The project feasibility under
the same risk assumptions is giving negative indicators as can be seen in the NPV,
and the LCOE is higher than the assumed remuneration. However, the advantages
of auctioning can be obtained and it can be argued that it will have a positive effect
on the operation toward being more demand oriented. In general, the implication of
the MPexante (Auc) in the PV case are in the same direction as in the Wind Onshore
MPexante (Auc) scenario.
5.2.8 Auctioned Capacity Payment
The calculated NPV for the CP scenario is -1.9164 Mile, as shown in figure 5.6. The
difference between this value and the reference scenario NPV is -3.8651 Mile, this
means that the NPV is reduced by -200% compared to the reference scenario NPV as
shown in figure 5.7. The calculated IRR is 2.4 %. As shown in figure 5.8 this value is
-75.5% lower than the reference scenario IRR. The LCOE calculated is 691 e/MWh,
which is 100% higher than the reference scenario LCOE as shown in figure 5.9. The
DSCR calculated value is 0.61%, which is reduced by -31.5% compared to the reference
scenario DSCR.
For the CP(Auc) scenario, the NPV is much lower than Zero which indicates that
the investment can not be profitable. The IRR as well is much lower than the WACC
(9.26%), in addition the LCOE is much higher that the assumed remuneration value
(which is 457 e/MWh), which gives an impression that making profits can not be
secured. The DSCR is lower than 1%, that may have an influence on the debt decision
of financing the project.
As in the Wind Onshore CP (Auc) scenario, the economic indicators are highly af-
fected due to the risk levels associated with the scenario and other factors illustrated
in the Wind Onshore section. According to the financial indicators of the project,
the economic fesability of the project is highly affected and the implications of the
CP (Auc) scenario in the PV case is taking the investment attractiveness to the same
direction as in the Wind Onshore case . On the operation level, there is still no clear
incentive to respond to market signals due to the same challenges explained in the
Wind Onshore CP(Auc) scenario.
7 Risk factors are in table 4.9, capital structure and WACC calculation are in table 4.14
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While looking at the results it is important to take into consideration that
the financial indicators calculated do not only depend on the selected RES technology
and support mechanism scenario, but also on the selected case study for each RES-E
technology. In other words, different locations for Onshore Wind or PV plant can result
in different calculated values for NPV,LCOE,IRR and DSCR. However, in general the
same directional effect of the scenario implication regarding the increase or decrease of
the value can be recognized in other case studies. Because the effect of increasing or
deceasing is a result of the support mechanism risks, but the quantity of such increase
or decrease is a factor of the risk level and the RES-E technology case study as well.
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6 Conclusion and Recommendations
RESMIP Model is developed to analyze the implications of difference RES-E support
mechanisms on investment and operation using a scenario analysis base. It has been
demonstrated in the case studies that, selected financial indicators are calculated tak-
ing into consideration different risk types on investment and operation levels, these
indicators can give a pre-feasibility analysis result for investment decision making on
go or not-go basis. Moreover, the model fulfils the objective of giving policy makers an
impression regarding the directional effect of a support mechanism on investment and
operation for different RES-E technologies.
Simple and transparent modelling approach can help the non-specialist policy mak-
ers to understand the different analysis stages in the model, and have an overview
about how the results are driven. Such understanding can help in analysing the results
and building conclusions, taking into account the uncertainties and assumptions that
have lead to the final results. It can be seen from each analysis stage outcome and
the results that the model is consistent, as each step depends on the outcome of the
previous one to build up a big picture of the final result. An important factor taken
into consideration in the model description is the transparency of assumptions related
to each analysis stage in order to give a clear understanding of the reasons behind each
driven result.
Although that the scope of the study focused only on two RES-E technologies (Wind
Onshore and PV), but the model can be used to analyze other technologies using the
proper technology specific assumptions. Furthermore, the analysis of other RES-E sup-
port mechanisms outside the scope of the study is possible as well using the model. In
general the RESMIP model provide a flexible tool that can be integrated into a wider
scope models like the AMIRIS Model1.
Regarding the model related uncertainties; estimating the level of the risk factors
under each scenario is challenging in the qualitative assessment stage. The sensitivity
analysis benefits in the determination of different risk factors impacts. But there is a
positive or negative uncertainty amount in the assumption of the risk factor probability
amount, as some of the risk factors can be related to indicators like the probability of
having negative prices in the market, but others can not and the estimation has to be
1 AMIRIS is an agent-based simulation model developed in the system analysis and technology
assessment department at DLR (German Aerospace Center), used on the one side to analyze
relevant market actors in the German electricity system and their changes in behaviour due to
modifications in the energy policy framework. On the other side the impacts on the system level
due to these changes in behaviour of the relevant actors in the context of market integration of
RES are investigated.
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done on qualitative analysis bases.
The study scope included the analysis of proposed support mechanisms scenarios.
It was challenging to determine the assumptions related to the WACC calculation
variables like the debt and equity shares and required rate of return, specially that it
will vary depending on how different investors perceive the risk and evaluate it. It was
also challenging to estimate the support mechanism risk premium used in the CAPM
model under each scenario, specially that the values for such assessment factor can
not be found in previous studies and it is relevant as well to the perception towards
risk. The determination of the change in the capacity factor as well is simplified and
made under a general assumption related to the negative prices. On the other hand,
for the current used support mechanisms (regulated FIT and MPexpost), estimating
the financial figures for the WACC calculations is done using the published market
figures in literature and recent studies. Due to the PV market status, more studies can
be found related to Wind Onshore than to PV, which increase the uncertainty in the
PV assumption more than in the Wind assumptions due to the dependency on limited
number of publications.
The case studies as well included a simplification assumption of adapting the same
remuneration level as in the reference scenario. This assumption is done for the pro-
posed support mechanisms scenarios as it is challenging to estimate the amount of
remuneration under each scenario, due to the amount of details which have to be taken
into consideration, as the difference between the remuneration amount based on the
plant size, the differences of remuneration between different technologies, the structure
of the mechanism whether to be degrading or fixed over time, how much the degra-
dation rate will be and how it will be implemented, will the remuneration be linked
to the energy yield of the plant or not, and more support mechanism details. On the
other side, this simplified assumption does not hardly affect the model outcomes and
it makes the comparison between different mechanisms more transparent, in addition
to reducing the uncertainties in the comparison results. Moreover, the main scope of
the study is to evaluate the implications of the different risk levels associated with each
scenario on the investment compared to the reference scenario, not to make a detailed
precise economic feasibility study of the project for investment evolution.
One of the strengths considered in the model, is using various financial indicators.
This is an important element for the assessment as the results showed. Each indicator
represents a measurement that is used by one of the project participates (equity and
debt) to assess the project feasibility from his point of view. Moreover, it can happen
that some indicator values can experience a decrease and others experience an increase
or remain unchanged under the same scenario, due to the difference in the financial
variable structure between equity and debt as in the case of the Regulated Market
Premium ex-ante in the Wind Onshore and PV scenarios.
On the support mechanisms level, the assessment shows that some mechanisms can
work successfully in terms of securing the investment and encouraging the deployment
of RES-E technologies, but neglecting the implication on the market economic effi-
ciency, and do not encourage the operation to react to the market signals like the
FIT. Others can lead to a more demand oriented operation behaviour and support
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the integration of RES-E on the market and system levels, but with involving higher
uncertainties on the security of investment, which have to be taken into consideration
from policy makers like the MPexpost and MPexante. Moreover, it is highly arguable
for other support mechanisms that can have benefits on the system level like the CP,
whether that it introduces a benefit for the operation and investment or not.
This study recommends for policy makers:
First, not only the effectiveness and efficiency of the support mechanism have to be
taken into account in assessing the implication of a support mechanism (as in most of
the recent studies), but also it is very important to consider certain aspects related to
the implications on investment and operation in more details. Moving beyond depend-
ing on the traditional ex-post evaluation of the installed capacity in Megawatts for a
certain time of period and using it as an effectiveness indicator for a support mecha-
nism, toward including the analysis of the implications on the investment decision and
the financial indicators, can help to solve the inherent problem of data availability and
allow policy makers to take decisions with the benefit of foresight. ”An interesting
feature of looking at investment rather than installed capacity is that it works almost
like a time machine” [WM12]. In addition, consideration of investment risk is an im-
portant factor for policy assessment. While two support mechanisms (such as the case
of the feedin-tariff and the green certificate mechanisms) might be expected to have
similar outcomes in economic models without proper consideration of investment risks,
a decision can be made based on such analysis and then empirical evidences prove
that it was not appropriate. This have been offered as the reason of the feedin-tariff
success over the green certificate mechanism [WM12]. On the other side of the coin,
overlooking the policy implications on plant operation can lead to the same current
problems in Germany, of having the desired installed capacity on one hand, but having
economic and technical challenges related to the fluctuating RES-E (which one of the
reasons for it is the operation behaviour) on the other hand.
Second, in the case of infrequent RES-E technologies like Wind Onshore and PV,
linking the remuneration directly to the market prices can create an incentive for more
efficient plant operation, and reduces the technical and economical implications of
imbalances. But on the other hand, it has a major effect on the project economic
feasibility as there is almost no means of adjusting the production as it is based on
resource availability, which can have an effect on investment attractiveness in these
technologies. So balancing between these two sides is an important element to be con-
sidered by policy makers.
Third, it is important to structure the support mechanism in a way that differen-
tiate between the RES-E technologies. It is not sufficient to develop a general market
mechanism that takes all RES-E infrequent technologies as one package, and differenti-
ate only by defining a technology specific remuneration for each RES-E technology. As
it was clear from the model analysis results that there is a difference between how the
project feasibility react differently in the Wind Onshore and PV cases under the same
scenario. This gives an indication that certain mechanism structure can be acceptable
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from the investment side for one RES-E technology, but not for the other. In addition,
another empirical indicator supporting this recommendation is that in the current case
in Germany even that the market premium is introduced and big portion of the Wind
production is reimbursed under the Market Premium scheme, but still the majority of
the PV generators are adapting the FIT and do not have an incentive to change to the
market premium [GP13a].
Fourth, the level of maturity of the RES-E technology has to be considered as one
of the policy design elements for a successful mechanism. An argument quoted in
[BPAZB12] that ” Auctions appear to be the unavoidable heirs to successful FIT pro-
grams ” can be applicable only in the case of technologies that have reached the market
maturity as it can be reliable in estimating the required remuneration. It has to be
considered as well that such transaction from regulatory based schemes to auctioning,
will benefit only the investment and market economic efficiency, but it will not lead to
a full integration of RES-E in the electricity market.
Fifth, placing parallel active mechanisms like the current case in Germany with the
FIT and MPexpost, will benefit the investment and give the freedom to adapt the
mechanism that suits the resource nature as in the PV and Wind current market case.
This overlapped transaction also provide experiences regarding the market dynamics
and the market actors behaviour. One of the learning lessons of the recent political
changes in the RES-E support mechanism in Germany, is that operators do not take
long period to adapt changes in the support mechanism structure (estimated 68% of
all on and off shore wind power production in 2012 was reimbursed according to the
Market premium scheme) [GP13a]. Such experiences with the market dynamics and
actors behaviour towards change will be build over time, and it is needed in-order to
reach the objectives of considering renewable energy sources as a main source of energy
in Germany. However, the existence of parallel mechanisms place a doubt of whether
the change happened in certain levels, like in the production behaviour change toward
integration RES-E in the market in a narrow sense (through voluntary curtailment of
production in case of high negative prices) , will be further developed and permanent
or not.
Sixth, defining a fixed remuneration for the infrequent RES-E technologies (like
Wind Onshore and PV) and isolating them from the market price volatility, is a suc-
cessful way to create an incentive for investment in these technologies. This remunera-
tion can be defined by the regulator, and moving gradually toward being on auctioning
bases in a competitive market environment, side by side with the maturity develop-
ment of the technology. This movement toward auctioning is in order to maintain high
level of subsidy efficiency and avoid over compensation. But it has to be taken into
account how to discourage creating market powers in order to maximize the profit, as
it will be hard for private investment in that case to enter the market. This can be
done through investors categorization, by defining the level of remuneration based on
the plant capacity as in the current case of the FIT, in order to make the investment
in certain plant capacities unattractive for specific investors like the incumbent ones
who will require a higher rate of return, but on the other hand attractive for another
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category of investors like the private investor. On the other side, the isolation from
the market prices volatility will not solve the operation behaviour problem, the partic-
ipation of operators in the balancing process and burden the costs is necessary. This
can be done through involving the operators in the ancillary market by bearing the
extra imbalances costs partially or totally. This will give an incentive for improving the
forecasting quality of production and demand on the short-term, and fully integrating
the RES-E on the market and system levels on the long-term.
Lastly, addressing the technical and economical challenges and potentials on the
whole scale of the energy system, including ancillary markets, cooper plat expansion,
investment in storage capacities , demand side management, smart grid and the need
for a proper market design, is essential for creating a long-term electricity system with
high shares of RES-E.
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”Technological advances, and in some cases breakthrough, are certainly needed: but
the revolution required is one of attitudes”[Gru90]. By these words Grubb since 1990
quoted in his study of modernized renewable energy technologies, the extensive view
which has to be considered by a multitude of actors from policy makers to citizens,




The RESMIP model has lot of areas of enhancement and development potential. Start-
ing with reducing the uncertainties related to the qualitative assessment of the support
mechanisms, specially the probability of each risk factor. Such enhancement will have
a reflection on the overall assessment of the risk level of each support mechanism, con-
sequently the related assumption regarding the support mechanism risk premium will
experience improvement as well. This enhancement can be done through searching
for the appropriate indicators (by market surveys with investors and operators and/or
literature review if relative publications are available) for each risk factor which can
give an impression regarding the likelihood of having this risk under the investigated
scenario. Another aspects of enhancement are the uncertainties related to the WACC
calculation financial parameters (like the debt and equity requirements ) , such en-
hancement will have a major reflection on the overall accuracy of the results, that can
be done through market surveys with different types of investors. Market surveys can
also help in understanding the risk perception of various investors categories. Such
understanding will support the interpretation of how the evaluation for the same risk
factor varies among different types of investors, and how various financial indicators
(e.g NPV,IRR,LCOE and DSCR) are settled based on this evaluation. Improvement
of the results can be done as well though the support mechanism structure assump-
tions, as making the relevant assumption to the mechanism design more applicable and
economic efficient if possible, and including assumptions related to the remuneration
differences under each scenario. On the operation side, improving the effects on the
capacity factor assumptions under each scenario can participate as well in the enhance-
ment of the model accuracy.
Regarding the model further development potentials. Adding a RES-E tech-
nology parameter in the quantitative assessment stage will increase the simplicity of
considering other RES-E technologies in the model. Furthermore, including the in-
vestor’s portfolio aspects and other behavioural factors rather than the risk perception
as the perceived importance of policy type, support level and support duration, in ad-
dition to the confidence in the market efficiency and technology effectiveness and other
behavioural factors as proposed in [MM12], can be taken into account in the model
development. Another aspect of development is that instead of using an external model
for the economic analysis, developing an economic analysis model will make it more
easier to use the model as one package in case it will be integrated into a wider scope
model. Moreover, the whole model concept can be implemented using a programming
language like Java or python in order to optimize the scenario investigation time and
support it’s integration into a wider scope model.
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This study is done in the ”Support Schemes and Economic Aspects”
group at the System Analysis and Technology Assessment department of
the Institute of Technical Thermodynamics at the DLR(German
Aerospace Center), and the modelling and findings of this study may be
used in the future development of the AMIRIS model.
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Appendix A
RESMIP case studies input parameters






































Total electricity production per year 17422 16524 Capacity factor change
Project related assumptions
Table 7.1: Wind Regulated MPexpost case study input parameters








debt interest rate 5.20% 6.20% Higher risk level
debt term 15 years

















Total electricity production per year 17422 16524 Capacity factor change
Project related assumptions
Table 7.2: Wind Regulated MPexante case study input parameters
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debt interest rate 5.20% 9.00% Higher risk level
debt term 15 years

















Total electricity production per year 17422 16524 Capacity factor change
Project related assumptions
Table 7.3: Wind Regulated CP case study input parameters




















Table 7.4: Wind Auctioned FIT case study input parameters
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Total energy production MWh/year 17422 15626 Capacity factor change
Project related assumptions
Table 7.5: Wind Auctioned MPexpost case study input parameters



































Total electricity production per year 17422 15626 Capacity factor change
Project related assumptions
Table 7.6: Wind Auctioned MPexante case study input parameters
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Total electricity production per year 17422 16524 Capacity factor change
Project related assumptions
Table 7.7: Wind Auctioned CP case study input parameters



























Table 7.8: PV Regulated MPexpost case study input parameters
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Table 7.9: PV Regulated MPexante case study input parameters





























Table 7.10: PV Regulated CP case study input parameters
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Table 7.11: PV Auctioned FIT case study input parameters




Financial assumptions  Share of debt 80% 75% Uncertainty in cash flow
Debt term 15 years





















Table 7.12: PV Auctioned MPexpost case study input parameters
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Table 7.13: PV Auctioned MPexante case study input parameters




































Difference in NPV 
compared to ref- 
scenario
IRR  (%)  LCOE (€/MWh)
Increase in LCOE 
compared to ref- 
scenario
DSCR (%)
Reg FIT (Reference Scenario) 3.8152 0.0000 18.0% 72.12 0 1.83%
Mpexpost 2.6975 -1.1177 15.8% 76.3 4.18 1.73%
Mpexante 1.7507 -2.0645 13.5% 80.36 8.24 1.75%
CP 0.0925 -3.7227 10.9% 90.31 18.19 1.69%
Auc FIT 3.6120 -0.2032 18.0% 72.63 0.51 1.83%
Mpexpost 1.3471 -2.4681 12.2% 82.35 10.23 1.71%
Mpexante 0.8348 -2.9804 11.6% 85.27 13.15 1.66%
CP -1.1205 -4.9357 7.5% 100.42 28.3 1.47%
NPV IRR   LCOE DSCR
Reg Mpexpost -29.30 -11.99 5.80 -5.46
Mpexante -54.11 -25.17 11.43 -4.37
CP -97.57 -39.35 25.22 -7.65
Auc FIT -5.33 0.00 0.71 0.00
Mpexpost -64.69 -32.26 14.18 -6.56
Mpexante -78.12 -35.58 18.23 -9.29




Difference in NPV 
compared to ref- 
scenario
IRR  (%)  LCOE (€/MWh)
Increase in LCOE 
compared to ref- 
scenario
DSCR (%)
Reg FIT (Reference Scenario) 1.9487 0.0000 9.80% 344 0 0.89%
Mpexpost 1.0037 -0.9450 7.50% 390 46 0.79%
Mpexante 0.1895 -1.7592 6.40% 442 98 0.79%
CP -1.3107 -3.2593 4.20% 590 246 0.70%
Auc FIT 1.8337 -0.1150 9.80% 348 4 0.89%
Mpexpost -0.3224 -2.2711 4.70% 484 140 0.72%
Mpexante -0.6511 -2.5998 4.30% 516 172 0.69%
CP -1.9164 -3.8651 2.40% 691 347 0.61%
NPV IRR   LCOE DSCR
Reg Mpexpost -48.49 -23.47 13.37 -11.24
Mpexante -90.28 -34.69 28.49 -11.24
CP -167.26 -57.14 71.51 -21.35
Auc FIT -5.90 0.00 1.16 0.00
Mpexpost -116.54 -52.04 40.70 -19.10
Mpexante -133.41 -56.12 50.00 -22.47
CP -198.34 -75.51 100.87 -31.46
Change in value compared to the reference scenario in (%)
Change in value compared to the reference scenario in (%)
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